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We consider the problem faced by a recommender system which seeks to offer a user with unknown preferences
an item from a potentially uncountable or countably infinite collection. Before making a recommendation,
the system has the opportunity to elicit the user’s preferences by making a moderate number of queries. Each
query corresponds to a pairwise comparison, in the spirit of choice-based conjoint analysis. We take the point
of view of either a risk averse or regret averse recommender system which only possess limited, set-based
information on the user utility function. We investigate two settings: a) an offline elicitation setting, where
all queries are made at once, and b) an online elicitation setting, where queries are selected sequentially
over time in an adaptive fashion. We propose exact robust optimization formulations of these problems
which integrate the preference elicitation and recommendation phases and study the complexity of these
problems. For the offline case, where the active preference elicitation problem takes the form of a two-stage
robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery, we provide an enumeration-
based algorithm and also an equivalent reformulation in the form of a mixed-binary linear program which
we solve via column-and-constraint generation. For the online setting, where the active preference learning
problem takes the form of a multi-stage robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information
discovery, we propose a conservative solution approach. We evaluate the performance of our methods on both
synthetic data and real data from the Homeless Management Information System. We simulate elicitation
of the preferences of policy-makers in terms of characteristics of housing allocation policies (measures of
fairness, efficiency, and interpretability) to better match individuals experiencing homelessness to scarce
housing resources. Our framework is shown to outperform the state-of-the-art techniques from the literature.
Key words : robust optimization, decision-dependent information discovery, preference elicitation.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Automated decision-making systems (also known as decision-support, recommender, or recommendation sys-
tems) are increasingly being used to assist human decision-makers. In particular, they have become prevalent
in environments where the set of alternatives is too large to enumerate (being potentially even uncount-
able or countably infinite), or when decisions need to be made in the presence of uncertainty or complex
constraints. In such settings, several research studies have shown that human decision-makers often fail to
identify an optimal (or near optimal) decision: they are boundedly rational, being limited by the information
they have, their cognitive abilities, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision, see Simon
(1955). Automated decision-making systems on the other hand have proved extremely powerful at parsing
through myriad alternatives in reasonable time to identify “the best” option. As an example, automated
decision-making systems are routinely used to recommend routes (see e.g., Google1 or Apple2 maps).
To be able to identify the “best” alternative to recommend, the decision-support system needs to under-
stand the preferences of the user (or agent) it is looking to assist. At the same time, preferences over alter-
natives can vary wildly from user to user. Thus, preference modelling and preference elicitation techniques
are needed to be able to make personalized recommendations that users are likely to adopt. The problem
of modeling and eliciting preferences has been of long standing interest in decision theory, psychology, and
economics (see e.g., Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Allais (1953), Debreu (1954), Slovic et al. (1977), and
Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), operations research and management science (see e.g., Zionts and Wallenius
(1976) and Dyer and Sarin (1979)), marketing (see e.g., Johnson (1987, 1991), Green and Srinivasan (1990),
Carroll and Green (1997), and Toubia et al. (2003, 2004, 2007)), and more recently artificial intelligence (see
e.g., Wang and Boutilier (2003), Boutilier et al. (2006) and Domshlak et al. (2011)).
The most common way to represent user preferences over a choice set is by means of the binary preference
relation. Given two alternatives, this relation asks which one is preferred. This relation then induces a partial
preorder over the elements of the choice set, allowing the automated decision-support system to reason over
preferences, to be able to answer ordering style queries. For example, it can identify the preferred item from
the choice set; or recommend a collection of preferred alternatives. Unfortunately, as the cardinality of the
choice set grows, eliciting the preferences of agents over this set under the binary preference model becomes
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impracticable or extremely costly (this is sometimes referred to as the preference bottleneck) and a more
structured framework is needed to achieve tractability.
Multi-attribute utility theory (see e.g., Dyer et al. (1992) and Keeney et al. (1993)) suggests that, when
choosing one alternative over another, a user is basing their decision on the attributes of the two options.
Under this model, alternatives are uniquely characterised by their attributes and can therefore be mapped
to points in a (potentially high-dimensional) Cartesian space. Under certain mild assumptions, see Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) and Debreu (1954), the preferences of agents over goods under this model can be
represented by a numeric function (not necessarily unique), termed utility or value function. This function
maps the attributes of each item to a single number, such that an item is preferred over another item if
and only if the former has a higher utility. This representation is useful to conduct preference elicitation
since binary preference relations between options for example can be mapped back to relations between the
attributes of the options, making the elicitation task more tractable.
Preference elicitation techniques (known as conjoint analysis in marketing) have emerged as a promising
means to learn the decision-maker’s preferences before making a (personalized) recommendation. They con-
sist in interactively querying the user, through a moderate number of strategically chosen questions, each
requiring little cognitive effort, to then be able to make high quality recommendations based on the prefer-
ence estimates. The most common type of query is a comparison query (referred to as choice-based conjoint
technique in the marketing literature). It takes the form of a pairwise comparison between alternatives, e.g.,
“Do you prefer option A or option B?”. More sophisticated queries have also been proposed. A metric paired
comparison asks the user to (approximately) quantify the difference in utility between two items. A sorting
query asks the user to sort all items in a collection; it is equivalent to asking all pairwise comparisons between
items in the collection. A bound query (also referred to as gamble query) asks the user to consider a single
outcome, and decide whether its value is greater or lower than some specified bound (this can be viewed as a
choice between the considered outcome and a random outcome with binomial distribution supported on the
best and worst outcomes, with probabilities b and 1− b, respectively). We refer the reader to e.g., Braziunas
and Boutilier (2010) for more detailed information on queries in preference elicitation.
Since only a moderate number of queries can be made, the preferences of the decision-maker are typically
not fully understood after the elicitation stage. This is exacerbated by the fact that, when given a choice
between alternatives, individuals may sometimes respond in seemingly “irrational” ways, being influenced by
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Figure 1 Preference elicitation for housing allocation at LAHSA. The figure on the left shows a very simple
sample pairwise comparison: the user is asked whether they would prefer a policy with outcomes A
(less fair, more efficient) or B (more fair, less efficient). The figure on the right illustrates the fact that
even if one only looks at one dimension of fairness and one dimension of efficiency, there may be many
outcomes (candidate policies) to choose from to compare.
the framing of the question, see Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Thus, preference elicitation
techniques are limited in the information they may provide and any subsequent recommendation needs to
be made under uncertainty in the utility function of the user. If information about the utility function is
encoded by means of a distribution, then the resulting recommendation problem can be formulated as a
stochastic program. On the other hand, if utility function information is encoded through membership in a
set, the recommendation problem can be expressed as a robust optimization problem which either maximizes
worst-case utility (see e.g., Ben-Tal et al. (2009)) or minimizes worst-case regret (see e.g., Savage (1951),
Milnor (1954), Stoye (2011)).
1.2. Motivating Applications
In this work, we are motivated by decision-making problems that are hard for human decision-makers to
solve, and where preferences over alternatives need to be well understood for an automated decision-making
system to be able to make high quality recommendations. Some concrete examples follow.
Public Housing Allocation. The main motivation behind this paper, which we also investigate in our com-
putational experiments, is the problem of allocating scarce housing resources to those experiencing homeless-
ness. Specifically, we aim to build a recommendation system for matching housing resources in Los Angeles
County to individuals experiencing homelessness in a way that optimizes the preferences of the Los Angeles
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Homeless Services Authority3 (LAHSA), the lead agency in charge of allocating public housing resources
in L.A. County to those experiencing homelessness. Currently, there are an estimated 58,000 individuals
experiencing homelessness in the L.A. area and only about 22,000 housing resources to help support these
individuals. There are two types of housing resources: Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) and Rapid
Rehousing (RRH). Different policies (and associated assignments of resources to individuals) will result in
different outcomes in terms of fairness, efficiency, and transparency of the system (e.g., varying wait times
and rates of exit from homelessness across the entire population and by race, gender, and sexual orientation).
In this case, the recommendation problem is a hard combinatorial problem (a stochastic/robust assignment
problem). At the same time, it is hard for homeless service providers to articulate their preferences over such
outcomes (attributes) upfront given that hard compromises have to be made. Thus, a preference elicitation
step is needed to understand the preferences of policy-makers before making recommendations for matching
individuals to resources. In fact, our partners at LAHSA have shared with us that the problem of quantifying
preferences in terms of the trade-offs between fairness, efficiency, and interpretability is a recurring theme
at their policy council meetings where policy-level decisions are made. In this work, we propose to elicit
the policy-maker preferences over policy characteristics (e.g., fairness/efficiency/interpretability trade-off)
by asking pairwise comparisons over policy outcomes, see Figure 1 for a simplified example. In our numerical
experiments, we use real data from the Homeless Management Information System4 (HMIS) to show how
our proposed algorithm can strategically select a subset of questions to ask the policy-makers to be able to
recommend their preferred policy.
Personalized Route Recommendations. In recent years, route recommendation systems have become per-
vasive. For example, in 2017, Google Maps reported reaching over 1 billion monthly users, see Popper (2017).
Different users will typically have different preferences over route attributes (e.g., travel time, travel distance,
congestion level, majority of highways or surface streets). Thus, a preference elicitation step is needed to
first understand the preferences of drivers before making route recommendations. After preferences have
been elicited, the recommendation problem takes the form of a stochastic/robust shortest path or travelling
salesman problem which is a hard combinatorial problem. Comparison queries can again be constructed in
this setting by putting the user in different situations (e.g., a simplified query may take the following form:
“You are late for a meeting. Would you prefer to employ route A with expected travel time 20 minutes and
with probability 10% that the travel time will be longer than 40 minutes; or, would you prefer route B with
expected travel time 25 minutes and worst-case travel time 30 minutes?”).
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Budget Allocation. Cities across the U.S., such as the City of L.A. for example, are given a finite budget that
they must choose how to allocate among various items5 (e.g., trees, street sweeping, sidewalks, pothole repair,
policing, fire hydrants, encampments, lane painting, illegal dumping, public trash cans, parking permits, and
enforcement). Depending on how budget is allocated, outcomes in the city will change (for example, number of
robberies, number of complaints about potholes). A recommendation system should aid the city in allocating
its funds between various items. In this case, the recommendation problem is a hard stochastic/robust
knapsack problem. Comparison queries can be constructed by putting the user in different scenarios about
the state of their city, e.g., by showing them statistics on the outcomes.
Note that in the examples above, the choice of a recommendation does not necessarily reduce to choosing
the best option among a given set of candidates: entirely new/custom products can be designed/synthesized.
1.3. Literature Review
The preference elicitation problem can be viewed as a sequential decision-making problem affected by uncer-
tainty over a finite planning horizon, where information available at any point in time is decision-dependent
(i.e., endogenous). At the beginning of each period, a query (or collection of queries) is made and the answer
to the query (or queries) made is observed before the next (set of) queries is selected. The choice of queries
to make at each period is allowed to adapt to the history of queries and their answers. At the end of the
planning horizon, an optimal recommendation is made based on the knowledge acquired. Our proposed
approach relates to both the literature on preference elicitation and to the works on stochastic and robust
optimization with decision-dependent information discovery. We review both of these in what follows.
1.3.1. Preference Elicitation Literature Preference elicitation approaches can be classified into one of
two frameworks depending on how they model and update uncertainty in the utility function. The first
framework takes a stochastic/Bayesian approach with aim to optimize expected utility. The second framework
takes a robust/set based viewpoint and usually aims to optimize either worst-case regret or worst-case utility.
Stochastic Methods. In this framework, a probabilistic prior is placed over the possible utility functions.
This prior typically takes the form of a density function over the utility function parameters. Each time
the answer to a query is observed, the prior is updated into a posterior (which acts as the prior for the
next period). After all queries are made and all answers are observed, the option with the greatest expected
utility is recommended. This model is computationally intractable and thus, to the best of our knowledge,
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all proposed approaches rely on (greedy) heuristics and approximation schemes to identify queries, see e.g.,
Chajewska et al. (2000), Boutilier (2002), Brochu et al. (2007), Zhao et al. (2018), and references therein.
Robust/Polyhedral Methods. Our approach most closely relates to the second framework which takes a
robust viewpoint by modeling uncertainty in the utility function as deterministic and set based. At the
beginning of the planning horizon, an uncertainty set of all feasible utilities is built. This set typically
takes the form of a polyhedron containing all feasible realizations of the utility function parameters. As
queries are made and answered, the uncertainty set is augmented with additional constraints that prune-out
any realizations of the utility function that are incompatible with the answers given. At the end of the
planning horizon, the option with the highest worst-case utility or lowest worst-case regret is recommended.
To the best of our knowledge, the first papers to take this approach originate in the marketing literature.
Motivated by the popularity of online conjoint analysis techniques (see e.g., Johnson (1987, 1991)) and by
the need for methods that provide reasonable estimates with fewer questions in problems involving many
parameters, Toubia et al. (2003, 2004) proposed polyhedral methods for metric paired comparisons and
pairwise comparisons, respectively. With polyhedral estimation, at each iteration, the question that is likely
to reduce the size of the uncertainty set the fastest is chosen. At the end of the planning horizon, and
under the assumption that all elements of the uncertainty set are equally likely, the recommendation is made
which performs best when the utility vector is given as the analytic center of the uncertainty polyhedron (to
maximize expected utility). Both the elicitation and recommendation tasks rely on efficient mathematical
programming techniques and are thus suitable for interactive use. Almost concurrently, Wang and Boutilier
(2003) investigate min-max regret based approaches for eliciting user preferences using gamble queries.
They show that myopically optimal queries that optimize various improvement criteria can be computed in
polynomial time. Boutilier et al. (2006) devise several procedures, based on mixed integer linear optimization,
to compute min-max regret solutions to recommendation problems. They also propose a number of heuristic
methods for utility elicitation applicable to pairwise comparison and gamble queries. Toubia et al. (2007)
provide a probabilistic interpretation of polyhedral methods and propose improvements that incorporate
response error and/or informative priors into individual-level question selection and estimation. Bertsimas
and O’Hair (2013) investigate pairwise comparison queries and generalize the approach from Toubia et al.
(2004) to allow for inconsistencies in user responses. The authors propose to use the max-min utility decision
criterion and robust optimization techniques to identify recommendations that are robust to uncertainty
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in the utility. Several of the above studies demonstrate promising performance of polyhedral methods on
both simulated and real preference data (field tests), see e.g., Toubia et al. (2003, 2004) and Braziunas and
Boutilier (2010). The approaches of Toubia et al. (2004), Boutilier et al. (2006), and Bertsimas and O’Hair
(2013) apply in our context and we will thus benchmark against them in our experiments.
In the present paper, we follow the robust/polyhedral approach to uncertainty modeling. However, we move
a significant step beyond the approaches above in that we study optimal approaches to preference elicitation
that integrate the elicitation phase with the downstream recommendation in a single two- or multi-stage
robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery.
1.3.2. Literature on Optimization with Decision-Dependent Information Discovery This type of prob-
lem was first studied in the context of stochastic programming where it was generally assumed that the
uncertain parameters are discretely distributed. In such cases, the decision process can be modeled by means
of a finite scenario tree whose branching structure depends on the binary decisions that determine the time of
information discovery. This research began with the works of Jonsbr˚aten et al. (1998) and Jonsbr˚aten (1998).
More recently, Goel and Grossman (2004) provided mixed-binary programming formulations of scenario
based stochastic programs with decision-dependent information discovery. Unfortunately, these formulations
are exponential in the number of endogenous uncertain parameters and thus they propose a conservative
solution approach that precommits the measurement decisions in the first period. Goel and Grossman (2006),
Goel et al. (2006) and Colvin and Maravelias (2010) propose optimization-based solution techniques that
truly account for the adaptive nature of the measurement decisions. Colvin and Maravelias (2010) and Gupta
and Grossmann (2011) investigate iterative solution schemes based on relaxations of the non-anticipativity
constraints. Our paper most closely relates to the works of Vayanos et al. (2011) and Vayanos et al. (2019),
wherein the authors investigate two- and multi-stage stochastic and robust programs with decision-dependent
information discovery that involve continuously supported uncertain parameters. Vayanos et al. (2011) pro-
pose a decision-rule based approximation approach that relies on a pre-partitioning of the support of the
uncertain parameters. Vayanos et al. (2019) propose a solution method based on the K-adaptability approx-
imation. They also investigate an active preference elicitation problem; their approach however does not
apply to the case of comparison queries. In fact, none of the above approaches apply in our setting which
presents a combination of discrete and continuous uncertain parameters, namely the responses to the queries
and the vector of utility function coefficients.
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1.4. Proposed Approach & Contributions
We now summarize our proposed approach and main contributions in this paper:
(a) We investigate the active preference elicitation problem under the robust/polyhedral approach to uncer-
tainty modelling, under both the max-min utility and min-max regret decision criteria. We propose
the first (to the best of our knowledge) formal mathematical formulation of the robust active prefer-
ence elicitation problem that integrates the learning and recommendation phases under this model. We
investigate two settings: a) an offline elicitation setting, where all queries are made at once, and b)
an online elicitation setting, where queries are selected sequentially over time in an adaptive fashion.
The offline (resp. online) active elicitation problem takes the form of a two-stage (resp. multi-stage)
robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery involving both discrete and
real-valued uncertain parameters.
(b) We show that the offline and online robust active elicitation problems (under both the max-min utility
and min-max regret decision criteria) are NP-hard even if the recommendation set consists of only
two items. We also demonstrate that, under the max-min utility criterion, if the recommendation set
is convex, then there is no value in being strategic about the queries to ask.
(c) In the case of the offline elicitation problem, we provide an enumeration-based algorithm which applies
when the number of queries (and items to compare) is small. For larger number of queries, we provide
an equivalent reformulation in the form of a mixed-binary linear program. We augment this formulation
with symmetry breaking constraints and a column-and-constraint generation algorithm to speed-up
computation. For the online elicitation setting, we propose a conservative solution approach combined
with a folding horizon strategy. We show that under this approximation, the online active elicitation
problem reduces to solving a sequence of offline active elicitation problems.
(d) We perform case studies based on both synthetic data and real data from the HMIS. For the real data
case we design policies for prioritizing homeless youth for housing resources in a way that meets the
preferences of policy-makers. We demonstrate competitive performance relative to the state of the art
in terms of solution time and solution quality. Our case study also highlights the benefits of minimizing
worst-case regret relative to maximizing worst-case utility.
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1.5. Organization of the Paper and Notation
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the model of our recommender
system and the preference model that underlies our approach. Sections 3 and 4 study the offline and online
problems, respectively. The min-max regret versions of these problems are investigated in Section 5. Section 6
generalizes the approaches in the previous sections to handle inconsistent user responses. Several strategies for
speeding-up computation are proposed in Section 7. Section 8 describes our numerical results and Section 9
concludes. The proofs of all statements can be found in the Electronic Companion to the paper.
Notation. Throughout this paper, vectors (matrices) are denoted by boldface lowercase (uppercase) letters.
The kth element of a vector x ∈ Rn (k ≤ n) is denoted by xk. We let e (resp. ei) denote the vector of all
ones (resp. the ith basis vector) of appropriate dimension. With a slight abuse of notation, we may use the
maximum and minimum operators even when the optimum may not be attained; in such cases, the operators
should be understood as suprema and infima, respectively. Finally, for a logical expression E, we define the
indicator function I (E) as I (E) := 1 if E is true and 0 otherwise.
2. Model
In this section, we define items (goods) in terms of their attributes, formalize the set based preference model
that underlies our approach, introduce the notion of a (comparison) query that can be used to elicit user
preferences, and describe the information gained as a byproduct of an answer to a query. We introduce
the robust recommendation problems which, given a set based model of utility uncertainty, recommend a
product that either maximizes worst-case utility or minimizes worst-case regret. We also derive the robust
counterparts of these problems. In this way, this section lays the foundations for the computation of optimal
active preference elicitation strategies in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6.
2.1. Items (Goods)
In the spirit of multi-attribute utility theory (see Section 1) we assume that, when choosing one item over
another, a user is basing their decision on the attributes of the two options. Thus, each item x is uniquely
characterized by its J attributes and can therefore be modelled as a point in a J-dimensional Cartesian
space, i.e., x = (x1, . . . ,xJ), where xj ∈ R, j = 1, . . . , J , denotes the jth attribute of item x ∈ RJ . In this
work, we are motivated by settings where J may be high-dimensional (taking values in the order of 10 or 20
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for example). We denote the universe of all feasible (realizable) items by X ⊆RJ –this set can be thought of
as collecting all product configurations that are possible to produce.
Example 1 (Attributes of Policies for Homeless Services Provision). Policies for matching scarce
housing resources to individuals experiencing homelessness can be characterized in terms of various attributes
quantifying their fairness, efficiency, and interpretability characteristics, see Vayanos et al. (2019). These
include (but are not limited to): expected wait time (overall, by gender, by race), probability of receiving
a resource of each type (by gender, by race), probability of exiting homelessness (overall, by gender, by
race), number of features used in the policy, depth of the tree for the case of decision-tree-based policies, see
e.g., Azizi et al. (2018). In this case, the feasible set X corresponds to the set of attribute values that can
be attained by any given policy in the space of allowable policies (e.g., linear or decision-tree based policies)
taking into account resource limitations.
2.2. User Preferences
We assume that the user has an (unknown) not necessarily strict preference over the items in the universe X .
For two items x, y ∈ X , we mark the weak preference relation by  so that x y means that “the agent
prefers y at least as much as x” or “the agent weakly prefers y to x.” Accordingly, we use the symbol ∼ as a
shorthand to the indifference relation so that x∼ y if and only if (x y)∧ (yx), which reads “the agent
is indifferent between x and y”. Lastly, we employ the symbol ≺ to indicate the strong preference relation
so that x≺ y if and only if (x y)∧ (y 6x), which reads “the agent strictly prefers y to x.”
To streamline presentation, we begin by making the following assumption, common in rational choice
theory, see Arrow (1963), and relax it later in Section 6.
Assumption 1 (Rationality). We assume that the user is rational in the sense that their preferences over
items satisfy the following axioms:
1. Completeness: For all x and y ∈X , we have x y, or x≺ y, or x∼ y.
2. Transitivity: For all x, y, and z ∈X , it holds that if item x is weakly preferred to item y, and item y
is weakly preferred to z, then x is weakly preferred to z. Mathematically, we have:
x y ∧ y z ⇒ x z ∀x, y, z ∈X .
3. Antisymmetry: If x y and yx, then x∼ y.
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Assumption 1 implies that, given the universe X of exhaustive and exclusive items to choose from, the user
can rank the elements of this set in terms of their preferences in a consistent way (the ranking constitutes a
total ordering), and the set has at least one maximal element.
We propose to represent user preferences with an (unknown) utility function u : X → R and analyze the
user’s behavior indirectly with utility functions. Note that, by Debreu’s Representation Theorem, this is
always possible under Assumption 1 if X has finite cardinality or if the preference relation is continuous,
see Debreu (1954). Thus, u ranks each item in the universe X . The user strictly prefers x to y if and only
if u(x)>u(y). Accordingly, they are indifferent between x and y if and only if u(x) = u(y). When we relax
Assumption 1 in Section 6, we will also propose a way to model user preferences via utility functions while
directly capturing inconsistencies.
We make the following assumption regarding the utility function.
Assumption 2 (Linear Utility and Polyhedral Uncertainty). The user utility function u : X → R is
linear being expressible as u(x) :=U >x for some (random) vector U supported in the uncertainty set U0 ⊆
RJ . Moreover, the set U0 is a non-empty full-dimensional bounded polyhedron, given by U0 := {u∈RJ |Bu≥
b} for some matrix B ∈RM×J and vector b∈RM .
The assumption above is very common in the literature on preference elicitation, see e.g., Toubia et al.
(2003, 2004, 2007), Boutilier et al. (2006), Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013). It is in fact the central assumption
behind polyhedral methods in marketing, see Section 1.3.1. The assumption that prior information on U can
be encoded using linear inequality constraints as in the set U0 is very natural. Indeed, as will become clear
later on (see Section 2.4), the type of queries we propose gives rise to such inequalities. Assumption 2 can be
relaxed to allow that U0 presents equality constraints (rather than only inequalities) and that it possesses
an inner point (rather than being full-dimensional).
Example 2. If no prior information is available on the random utility coefficients U , then one may take,
without loss of generality, U0 = [−1,1]J , as in e.g., Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013). Indeed, the utility coeffi-
cients can be scaled by a constant without affecting the preference ordering over items.
Example 3. One may restrict the utility function coefficients to add-up to one as in e.g., Toubia et al.
(2003). In that case, U0 = {u∈RJ+ : e>u= 1} and the coefficients u can be viewed as partworth utilities, i.e.,
numerical scores that measure how much each feature influences the user’s decision to make that choice.
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Example 4. If item x is a benchmark, one may normalize utilities relative to that item, by letting U0 =
{u∈ [−1,1]J : u>x= 1}.
2.3. Query Set and Recommendation Set
We let Q ⊆ X denote the query set, i.e., the set of items that the recommender system can use to build
queries. We make the following assumption on the query set.
Assumption 3 (Finite Query Set). The query set Q has finite cardinality I ≥ 2. Items in the query set
are indexed by i∈ I := {1, . . . , I} and the ith item in the set is denoted by xi ∈RJ . Thus, Q= {xi | i∈ I}.
Assumption 3 is very common in the literature. In fact, we have not been able to find a paper that does not
make this assumption. At the same time, this assumption is a very natural one. First, in most applications,
to be able to compare items, these items must exist. Second, this assumption holds naturally if the support
of all attributes is finite (e.g., few configurations for each attribute).
We denote by R ⊆ X the recommendation set, i.e., the collection of items from which the system can
draw to make a recommendation. In general, the sets Q and R need not coincide. The ability to cater for
cases where Q and R are distinct has received little attention in the literature but is important in practical
applications. Indeed, we may be able to design a new item (or product), that is not currently available,
to meet the needs of a decision- or policy-maker, in which case R is a strict superset of Q and may be
uncountable, countably infinite, or have a hard combinatorial structure. On the other hand, R may be a
strict subset of Q if for example some items, that are in principle offered, are out of stock. Next, we describe
some examples of recommendation sets that are useful in applications.
Example 5 (Shortest Path Recommendation). Probably one of the most common decision-support
systems consists in recommending routes from a given source s to a given destination t on a directed
graph (V,A) with node set V and edge set A so as to minimize a measure of user disutility, see Section 1.2.
In this case, the recommendation set takes the form of the feasible set of a shortest path problem given by
R=
x∈ {0,1}|A| : ∑
j:(i,j)∈A
xij −
∑
j:(j,i)∈A
xji = I(i= s)− I(i= t) ∀i∈ V
 .
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Example 6 (Knapsack Composition Recommendation). In numerous applications ranging from bud-
get allocation (see Section 1.2), project portfolio selection, and portfolio optimization, the recommendation
set involves a knapsack constraint. This knapsack recommendation set is given by
R=
{
x∈ {0,1}J :
J∑
j=1
wjxj ≤ W
}
,
where wj ∈R+, j = 1, . . . , J , represent weights associated with undertaking project/investment j (associated
with choice xj = 1) and W ∈R+ represents a budget limit. This set consists of a single constraint that requires
that the collection of projects/investments undertaken does not consume more than the available budget W .
Example 7 (Assignment Recommendation). A variety of recommendation problems are restricted by
assignment constraints. These arise when a number of agents indexed in the set A need to be assigned
to a number of tasks indexed in the set T , incurring some cost that may vary depending on the agent-
task assignment. It is required to perform all tasks by assigning each of them to an agent. The assignment
recommendation set takes the form
R=
{
x∈ {0,1}|A|×|T | :
∑
i∈A
xij = 1 ∀j ∈ T ,
∑
j∈T
xij = 1 ∀i∈A
}
.
It arises in numerous applications such as the matching of customers to cars in ridesharing apps (e.g., Uber6
or Lyft7), or in the allocation of scarce resources such as kidneys (see e.g., Bertsimas et al. (2013), Bandi
et al. (2018)) or public housing (see e.g., Azizi et al. (2018), Vayanos et al. (2019)).
Example 8 (Minimum Spanning Tree Recommendation). A variety of practical recommendation
problems that arise in applications are restricted by spanning tree constraints. These arise in the design of
networks, including computer networks, telecommunication networks, transportation networks, water supply
networks, and electrical grids. Given a directed graph (V,A) with node set V and edge set A, this recommen-
dation set takes the form
R=
x∈ {0,1}|A| : ∑
(i,j)∈A
xij = |V|− 1,
∑
(i,j)∈A:i∈S,j∈S
xij ≤ |S|− 1 ∀S ⊆ V
 .
2.4. Elicitation through Comparison Queries
Before recommending an item (or outcome) from the set R, the recommender system has the opportunity to
make a number of queries to the user. These queries (may) enable the system to gain information about U
(see Assumption 2) thus improving the quality of the recommendation. Each query takes the form of a
Vayanos, McElfresh, Ye, Dickerson, Rice: Active Preference Elicitation via Robust Optimization 15
comparison between two items in the query set. We denote the set of all comparisons the system may choose
from by C := {(i, i′) | i ∈ I, i′ ∈ I, i < i′}. Note that only comparisons of items i and i′ for i < i′ need to be
considered since the order of the items in each comparison does not matter. The set C can be augmented with
constraints that preclude for example items that are very similar from being compared. Such constraints may
be useful in practical settings where preferences are elicited using graphs, where minute differences in feature
values may not be distinguishable to the naked eye. Similarly, the set C can include constraints that ensure
that items to be compared only differ in a small number of features. Again, such constraints are important in
practical settings, where it may be hard, from a cognitive standpoint, for users to compare high-dimensional
items. We omit such constraints to minimize notational overheard.
We allow the recommender system to make K queries, indexed in the set K := {1, . . . ,K}, before making
a recommendation. We let ικ := (ικ1 , ι
κ
2)∈ C denote the κth query, κ∈K. Thus, ικ1 and ικ2 denote the indices
of the first and second items in the κth query, respectively: Query κ asks the user to compare xι
κ
1 and xι
κ
2 .
In particular, the user must choose one of three possible answers in response to query κ: (a) “I strictly prefer
xι
κ
1 to xι
κ
2 ” (i.e., xι
κ
1  xικ2 ); (b) “I am indifferent between xικ1 and xικ2 ” (i.e., xικ1 ∼ xικ2 ); or (c) “I strictly
prefer xι
κ
2 to xι
κ
1 ” (i.e., xι
κ
1 ≺xικ2 ).
We associate each possible answer to query κ to a response scenario sκ ∈ S := {−1,0,1} such that
sκ =

1 if xι
κ
1 xικ2
0 if xι
κ
1 ∼xικ2
−1 else.
The information obtained on U depends on the answer to query κ, i.e., on the response scenario. Each choice
imposes a different linear constraint on the random utility coefficients U , see Assumption 2: (a) If sκ = 1,
then U >xι
κ
1 > U >xι
κ
2 ; (b) If sκ = 0, then U >xι
κ
1 = U >xι
κ
2 ; and (c) If sκ = −1, then U >xικ1 < U >xικ2 .
We collect the answers to each query in the vector s := {sκ}κ∈K and accordingly let ι := {(ικ1 , ικ2)}κ∈K. After
all K queries have been made and the responses to the queries are observed, we can update the support
of U (i.e., the set of all possible realizations of U ) as follows (see Assumption 2):
U(ι,s) =

u∈ U0 : u>(xικ1 −xικ2 ) > 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) = 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 0
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) < 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1

. (1)
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We emphasize that the support of U after the K comparisons depends both on ι, the queries made, and
on s, the answers given by the user to the queries, see Figure 2.
2.5. Risk Averse & Regret Averse Recommendations
After K queries have been made and the answers to these queries have been observed, the recommendation
system needs to select (or design) an item from the (possibly uncountable, countably infinite, or combina-
torial) set R to recommend to the user. At the time when the recommendation is made, the coefficients U
are still unknown: they are merely known to belong to the uncertainty set U(ι,s). It is thus natural that the
system seeks to provide recommendations that are robust to all possible realization of U in the set U(ι,s).
We investigate two notions of robustness that are popular in the literature: recommendations that either
maximize worst-case utility (see e.g., Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013)) or that minimize worst-case regret (see
e.g., Boutilier et al. (2006)).
Maximizing Worst-Case Utility. Given uncertainty in the utility function coefficients, it is natural for risk
averse decision-makers to seek recommendations that will maximize the worst-case utility of the recommended
item. Mathematically, given the sequences, ι and s of questions and answers, the recommender system
offers the item with the maximum worst-case (minimum) utility for any u ∈ U(ι,s). Such a risk averse
recommendation solves the problem
maximize
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x. (Rrisk)
Note in particular that the optimal solution to this problem depends on both ι and s. While the recommender
system has no control over the agent responses, s, it can select the comparisons ι∈ CK so as to improve the
quality of the recommendation.
Minimizing Worst-Case Regret. Given uncertainty in the utility function coefficients, certain decision-
makers exhibit regret (rather than risk) aversion: they anticipate regret and thus incorporate in their choice
their desire to reduce it. According to the “worst-case absolute regret” criterion, the performance of a decision
is evaluated with respect to the worst-case regret that is experienced, when comparing the performance of
the decision taken relative to the performance of the best decision that should have been taken in hindsight,
after all uncertain parameters are revealed, see e.g., Savage (1951). The minimization of worst-case absolute
regret is often believed to mitigate the conservatism of classical robust optimization and is thus attractive
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Figure 2 Illustration of the uncertainty set update procedure when there are I = 3 items, each with J = 2 features,
the “true” (but unknown) utility vector is u?, and the system is allowed to ask K = 2 questions before
making a recommendation. The first row shows the three items x1, x2, and x3 in R2 (L) and the vectors
x1 − x2, x1 − x3, and x2 − x3 associated with each of the comparison queries (x1,x2), (x1,x3), and
(x2,x3), respectively (R). The left figure on the second row shows the initial uncertainty set U0, the
vector u?, and the hyperplanes associated with each of the queries. The remaining three figures show
the uncertainty set U(ι,s) updated in response to the three different pairs of queries {(x1,x2), (x1,x3)}
(row 2, R), {(x1,x2), (x2,x3)} (row 3, L), and {(x1,x3), (x2,x3)} (row 3, R). Note that the uncertainty
set changes depending on the queries asked and on the answers given, which in turn depend on the
underlying vector u? (whose value is unknown by the recommender system).
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in practical applications. Given the sequences, ι and s, the recommender system offers the item with the
minimum worst-case (maximum) regret for any u∈ U(ι,s). Such a regret averse recommendation solves the
problem
minimize
x∈R
max
u∈U(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
. (Rregret)
As in the risk averse case, the optimal solution to this problem depends on both ι and s. The choice of
comparison queries ι∈ CK should thus be guided by the downstream recommendation problem.
To the best of our knowledge, all preference elicitation techniques from the literature are heuristic and
do not provide guarantees on performance. In the present paper, we propose to compute provably optimal
queries that optimize worst-case utility (see Sections 3 and 4) and worst-case regret (see Section 5). In the
remainder of this paper, we focus on selecting a set of comparisons ι that maximizes (resp. minimizes) the
objective of Problem (Rrisk) (resp. (Rregret)) when the responses to the queries are adversarially chosen in
the sense that they are as “uninformative” as possible: they hinder the optimal values of the downstream
recommendation problems as much as possible.
2.6. Two Active Preference Elicitation Strategies: Offline and Online Elicitation
In this paper, we investigate two strategies for eliciting the preferences of the user. In the first, termed offline
preference elicitation, K queries are selected in advance, before any answer is revealed. We investigate offline
preference elicitation with the max-min utility (resp. min-max regret) decision criterion in Section 3 (resp.
Sections 5.1-5.4). In the second, termed online preference elicitation, K queries are selected one at a time and
the answer to each query is revealed before the next query is selected. We study online preference elicitation
with the max-min utility (resp. min-max regret) decision criterion in Section 4 (resp. Section 5.5).
Offline elicitation is for example common in low-resource settings where interactions with the user do not
involve a computer (e.g., paper-based questionnaires) or if it is necessary that all users be presented with
the same queries (e.g., in a controlled study). Online elicitation on the other hand is preferred in settings
where a computer is available and where different users can be presented with different options. Indeed, by
allowing the questions to adjust (or adapt) to the user responses, better questions can be chosen, yielding a
“smaller” uncertainty set U(ι,s) and a less conservative recommendation.
We emphasize that both the offline and online elicitation strategies are active in the sense that the choice of
queries to make is directly informed by the downstream recommendation problem: different recommendation
sets will yield different choices of queries. We believe that this sets us apart from existing literature.
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3. Offline Active Elicitation with the Max-Min Utility Decision Criterion
We begin by addressing the offline active preference elicitation problem with the max-min utility decision
criterion, which we also refer to as the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem. In this problem,
all K comparisons, ι := {ικ}κ∈K, are precommitted in advance, before any agent responses are observed.
After agent responses are observed, the uncertainty set is updated and an item with highest worst-case utility
is recommended. We have two motivations for studying this problem. First, the offline problem where all K
comparisons are selected in advance is interesting in its own right, see Section 2.6. Second, the offline problem
is a useful building block for (approximately) solving the online preference elicitation problem, see Section 4.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we formulate the offline preference elicitation problem
as a max-min-max-min optimization problem and study its complexity. We develop an enumeration based
solution approach and an equivalent reformulation in the form of a mixed-binary linear program (MBLP)
that can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Finally, in Section 3.4, we
propose a column-and-constraint generation approach for solving the MBLP.
3.1. Problem Formulation & Complexity Analysis
In the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem, the sequence of events is as follows. First, the
recommender system selects K queries ικ ∈ C, κ∈K, to ask the user. Subsequently, the user, who has a true
(but unknown) utility vector u? from U0, responds to the queries truthfully and rationally (see Assumption 1)
by selecting answers sκ to each query ι
κ in a way that complies with their utility vector u?. Note that the
utility vector u? is not observable to the recommender system; only the answers to the questions are. In fact,
the user themself is not aware of their vector u? (else, they would directly share it with the recommender
system). Once the answers to the queries are observed, the recommender system can certify that u? ∈ U(ι,s)
and solves the risk averse recommendation problem (Rrisk) by offering an item that is robust to all utility
vectors in U(ι,s). In this section, since the decision-maker is risk averse, it is natural that they be hedged
against adversarial responses s.
Mathematically, the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem is expressible as the following two-
stage robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery
maximize
ι∈CK
min
s∈S(ι)
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x, (PKoff,risk)
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where S(ι) := {s∈ SK | U(ι,s) 6= ∅} denotes the set of all answers compatible with some u ∈ U0. Indeed,
the set U(ι,s) is empty if and only if either the utility vector used to generate the answers is not in the
set U0 or if at least one of the answers provided was not rational, in the sense that it did not comply
with the chosen u ∈ U0. Since the set U0 is non-empty by Assumption 2, the set S(ι) is by construction
non-empty for all ι ∈ CK . Problem (PKoff,risk) is a “two-and-a-half” stage robust optimization problem with
decision-dependent uncertainty set.
Remark 1. Single-stage robust optimization problems with decision-dependent uncertainty sets have been
investigated by Spacey et al. (2012), Nohadani and Sharma (2016), Nohadani and Roy (2017), Zhang et al.
(2017), and Lappas and Gounaris (2018). Similarly, single-stage distributionally robust optimization prob-
lems have been studied by Noyan et al. (2018), Basciftci et al. (2019), Luo and Mehrotra (2019), and Ryu
and Jiang (2019). To the best of our knowledge, the only papers to investigate two- and multi-stage problems
with decision-dependent uncertainty are Bertsimas and Vayanos (2017) and Vayanos et al. (2011, 2019). The
papers Vayanos et al. (2011, 2019) are the only ones to apply to the case of decision-dependent information
discovery. Neither of these approaches applies in our context which presents a combination of discretely and
continuously supported uncertain parameters. At the same time, approaches for solving two-stage robust opti-
mization problems (see e.g., Bertsimas and Dunn (2017), Bertsimas and Georghiou (2015, 2018), Bertsimas
and Dunning (2016), Postek and Den Hertog (2016), Bertsimas and Caramanis (2010), Hanasusanto et al.
(2015), Subramanyam et al. (2017), Chassein et al. (2019), Rahmattalabi et al. (2019)) do not apply to Prob-
lem (PKon,risk), which presents decision-dependent information discovery and discretely supported uncertain
parameters. Thus, new solution techniques are required.
Problem (PKoff,risk) is difficult to solve for many reasons. First, it is a max-min-max-min problem. Second,
the uncertainty sets S(ι) and U(ι,s) for the first and second decision-stages are decision-dependent. Third,
the uncertainty set U(ι,s) depends upon the first stage uncertainty s and is also open, making it difficult
to derive computational solution approaches. The following lemma shows that Problem (PKoff,risk) can be
considerably simplified by eliminating the dependence of S(ι) on ι and by replacing the strict inequalities in
the set U(ι,s) by their loose counterparts.
Lemma 1. Problem (PKoff,risk) is equivalent to
maximize
ι∈CK
min
s∈SK
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x, (2)
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where
U˜(ι,s) :=

u∈ U0 : u>(xικ1 −xικ2 ) ≥ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) = 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 0
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≤ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1

in the sense that the two problems have the same optimal objective value and the same sets of optimal
solutions.
Lemma 1 follows naturally. First, note that since S(ι) is non-empty, there exist s∈ S(ι) such that U(ι,s) 6= ∅,
implying that the optimal objective value of Problem (PKoff,risk) is finite. On the other hand, any choice of
s ∈ SK\S(ι) will result in the inner maximization over u to be taken over an empty set, resulting in an
objective equal to +∞, implying that this choice of s is suboptimal. We can thus include such choices of s
in the first minimization without modifying the optimal value of the problem. Second, using Assumption 2
and classical results in polyhedral theory, it can be shown that for any given s ∈ SK such that U˜(ι,s) is
non-empty, we can construct s′ ∈ SK such that U(ι,s′) 6= ∅ and cl(U(ι,s′)) = U˜(ι,s). This implies that we
can relax the strict inequalities in the uncertainty set and retain an equivalent problem.
Before studying the complexity of the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem, we show that the
number of response scenarios in Problem (2) can be drastically reduced.
Observation 1. Problem (2) is equivalent to
maximize
ι∈CK
min
s∈S˜K
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x, (P˜Koff,risk)
where S˜ := {−1,1}, in the sense that the two problems have the same optimal objective value and the same
sets of optimal solutions.
Observation 1 is very natural. It states that it is never in “nature’s” favor to select scenarios s such that
sκ = 0 for some κ ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Indeed, declaring indifference as the answer to any query in Problem (2)
always results in an objective value that is no lower than that obtained by considering “” and “” responses
only.
Next, we show that Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is NP-hard when the recommendation set is discrete, which moti-
vates the integer programming based reformulations we provide in the next sections.
Theorem 1. The following claims about the complexity of Problem (P˜Koff,risk) hold true.
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(a) Suppose the recommendation set R is convex. Then, Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is polynomially solvable. More-
over, it holds that Problems (P˜Koff,risk) and (P˜0off,risk) are equivalent for all K ∈ N, i.e., in the case of
polyhedral recommendation set, in the worst-case, there is no benefit in asking any queries. In addition,
the optimal objective values of Problems (P˜Koff,risk) and (Rrisk) coincide.
(b) Evaluating the objective function of Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is NP-hard even if the recommendation set R
consists of only two elements.
Motivated by the complexity results above, we henceforth assume the recommendation set in Prob-
lem (P˜Koff,risk) is discrete and MBLP representable. We provide an enumeration-based approach for solv-
ing (P˜Koff,risk) in Section 3.2, which is motivated by settings where K is moderately valued. We provide a
general, MBLP reformulation of Problem (P˜Koff,risk) in Section 3.3 and a column-and-constraint generation
approach in Section 3.4. These are motivated by settings where K is large.
3.2. An Enumeration-Based Solution Approach for Small K
In the case of a small number of queries K and moderate number of items I, our approach relies on the follow-
ing proposition which shows that for any fixed ι∈ C and s∈ S˜K , the robust recommendation problem (Rrisk)
is equivalent to a single maximization problem of size polynomial in the size of the input.
Proposition 1. For any fixed ι∈ CK and s∈ S˜K, the robust recommendation problem (Rrisk) is equivalent
to the maximization problem
maximize b>β
subject to x∈R, α∈RK+ , β ∈RM+∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β=x,
(3)
whose size is polynomial in the size of the input. Problem (3) is a mixed-binary linear program.
The proof of this result relies on classical robust optimization techniques, see e.g., Ben-Tal et al. (2009)
and Gorissen et al. (2015). Our enumeration-based algorithm proposes to evaluate the objective value of
Problem (3) for all choices of ι∈ CK and s∈ S˜K to determine the choice of ι that will yield the highest worst-
case objective. The total number of queries whose performance we need to evaluate is |C|K = (|Q|(|Q|−1))K
and the total number of scenarios is |S˜K |= 2K . Thus, for small values of K (i.e., in the order of 1 to 3) and
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Algorithm 1: Enumeration-based algorithm for solving (P˜Koff,risk) for moderate values of K.
Input: Comparison set C, recommendation set R, uncertainty set U0, number of queries K;
Output: Optimal query ι? from CK ;
Initialization: ι?←∅; OPT←−∞;
for ι∈ CK do
foreach s∈ S˜K do
OPT(ι,s)← optimal objective of Problem (3);
end
if min
s∈S˜K
OPT(ι,s)>OPT then
OPT ← min
s∈S˜K
OPT(ι,s); ι?← ι;
end
end
moderate values of I (i.e., in the order of 10 to 20), it is computationally practicable to enumerate all choices
of ι∈ CK and s∈ S˜K .
We now propose to leverage Proposition 1 and the moderate cardinality of CK and S˜K to devise an
enumeration-based algorithm for solving Problem (P˜Koff,risk). The idea is as follows: for each ι∈ CK , we solve
2K instances of Problem (3) (one for each element s of S˜K) and record the minimum value of the objective
over these instances. The optimal solution to Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is given by the choice of ι that gives the
greatest minimum value. The total number of problems solved is given by (2|C|)K and can thus be done
efficiently if K is small. In particular, if K = 1, it reduces to solving 2|C| MBLPs. For clarity, our approach
is detailed in Algorithm 1. We note that although Algorithm 1 is very simple and intuitive in nature, it has
not (to the best of our knowledge) been proposed in the literature.
3.3. Exact MBLP Reformulation
In most real world applications, K is in the order of 8 to 10. In such settings, the number of possible query
combinations (i.e., the cardinality of CK) and response scenarios (i.e., the cardinality of S˜K) are both large so
that the enumeration approach proposed in Section 3.2 becomes computationally prohibitive. In this section,
24 Vayanos, McElfresh, Ye, Dickerson, Rice: Active Preference Elicitation via Robust Optimization
we propose an exact MBLP reformulation to Problem (P˜Koff,risk), which enables us to select queries optimally
even when K is large. This reformulation can leverage techniques from integer optimization to speed-up
computation and circumvent complete enumeration.
The first step towards reformulating Problem (P˜Koff,risk) consists in noting that we can exchange the order
of the inner minimization and maximization problems, provided we allow the choice of recommended item
to depend on the response scenario s. This statement is formalized in the following observation.
Observation 2. Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is equivalent to the following max-min problem
maximize
ι∈CK
max
xs∈R:
s∈S˜K
min
s∈S˜K
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>xs, (4)
where xs denotes the item to recommend in response scenario s, s∈ S˜K.
Observation 2 is the key to convert the “two-and-a-half” stage (min-max-min-max) Problem (4) to a single-
stage robust problem as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Problem (4) is equivalent to the following finite program
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK
αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , xs ∈R
τ ≤ b>βs∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αsκ +B>βs = xs

∀s∈ S˜K ,
(5)
where ι denotes the queries to make and xs the items to recommend in response scenario s∈ S˜K.
Next, we convert Problem (5) to a finite MBLP by introducing, for each query, binary variables which
indicate which item is included as first and second element in the query. Specifically, we encode the choice
of a query ικ ∈ C, κ∈K, using two sets of binary decision variables, vκ ∈ {0,1}I and wκ ∈ {0,1}I , whose ith
element is one if and only if item i is the first (resp. second) item in query κ. Equivalently, ικ = (i, i′) if and
only if vκi =w
κ
i′ = 1. The following theorem shows that Problem (5) can be reformulated as an MBLP.
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Theorem 2. Problem (5) is equivalent to the following mixed-binary linear program
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, vκ, wκ ∈ {0,1}I , κ∈K
αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
vsκ, wsκ ∈RI+, s∈ S˜K , κ∈K
τ ≤ b>βs∑
i∈I
xi
∑
κ∈K
sκ (v
sκ
i −wsκi ) +B>βs = xs
 ∀s∈ S˜K
e>vκ = 1, e>wκ = 1, 1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I, ∀κ∈K
vsκ ≤ Mvκ, vsκ ≤ αsκe, vsκ ≥ αsκe−M(e−vκ)
wsκ ≤ Mwκ, wsκ ≤ αsκe, wsκ ≥ αsκe−M(e−wκ)

∀s∈ S˜K
κ∈K,
(6)
where M is a “big-M” constant. In particular, given an optimal solution (τ,{vκ,wκ}κ∈K,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S˜K )
to Problem (6), an optimal set of queries for the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem is given by
ικ1 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (vκi = 1) and ικ2 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (wκi = 1) , κ∈K.
The first and second sets of constraints in Problem (6) originate directly from formulation (5). The third set
of constraints guarantees that the κth query ικ is such that ικ1 < ι
κ
2 , i.e., (ι
κ
1 , ι
κ
2) ∈ C. The fourth and fifth
sets of constraints enable us to linearize the products αsκv
κ and αsκw
κ.
Reformulation (6) is very attractive as it enables us to solve the risk averse offline preference elicitation
problem (PKoff,risk) as an MBLP using off-the-shelf solvers. For fixed K, Problem (6) is polynomial in the
size of the input. Yet, Problem (6) is exponential in K. Thus, further strategies are needed to ensure that
we can solve it faster as K grows. We note that offline surveys will typically involve a moderate numbers of
queries (e.g., K ≈ 10) to avoid tiring the user. Moreover, offline surveys are typically prepared in advance,
before interacting with the user, and so do not require instantaneous solution. Compared to the approach
proposed in Section 3.2, the MBLP formulation (6) is expected to be more tractable, since it can exploit
integer optimization technology to avoid enumerating all possible choices. To ensure that it can scale to
practical values of K, in the remainder of this section, we propose decomposition strategies to speed-up
solution. Additional strategies based on e.g., strengthening of the formulation are discussed in Section 7.
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3.4. Column-and-Constraint Generation
Problem (6) presents a number of decision variables and constraints that are exponential in K, making it
impracticable to solve when the number of queries is large. At the same time, due to the robust nature of
the problem, we expect that only a moderate number of scenarios s ∈ S˜K will be candidates to be active
in the epigraph constraint. For this reason, in this section, we propose a column-and-constraint generation
algorithm inspired from Vayanos et al. (2019) to speed-up computation and which applies when R has fixed
finite cardinality (in which case the problem is NP-hard, see Theorem 1). To minimize notational overhead,
we describe our column-and-constraint generation procedure using the finite program (5). Naturally, all
problems solved would need to be converted to MBLPs first using techniques similar to those employed in
Theorem 2. We omit these conversions to streamline presentation.
The key idea behind our algorithm is to decompose the problem into a relaxed master problem and a series
of subproblems indexed by s ∈ S˜K . The master problem initially only involves a subset of the constraints
(those indexed by s ∈ S ′ ⊆ S˜K) and a single auxiliary MBLP is used to iteratively identify indices s ∈ S˜K
for which the solution to the relaxed master problem becomes infeasible when plugged into subproblem s.
Constraints associated with infeasible subproblems are added to the master problem and the procedure
continues until convergence. We now detail this approach.
We define the relaxed master problem parameterized by the index set S ′ as
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK
αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , xs ∈R
τ ≤ b>βs∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αsκ +B>βs = xs

∀s∈ S ′.
(CCGmasterrisk (S ′))
Note that this problem only involves a subset of the decision variables and constraints of Problem (5). Given
variables (τ, ι) feasible in the master problem, we define the sth subproblem, s∈ S˜K , through
maximize 0
subject to α∈RK+ , β ∈RM+ , x∈R
τ ≤ b>β∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β = x.
(CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι))
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An inspection of the Proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the equality constraint in Problem (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι))
combined with the non-negativity constraints on α and β define the feasible set of the dual of a linear
program that is feasible and bounded. The objective function of this dual is b>β. Thus, for τ sufficiently
small, Problem (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι)) will be feasible. To identify indices of subproblems (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι)) that, given
a solution (τ, ι) to the relaxed master problem, are infeasible, we solve a single feasibility MBLP defined
through
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K , ux ∈ U0 ∀x∈R
θ ≥ (ux)>x ∀x∈R
(ux)>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≥ −M(1− sκ)
(ux)>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≤ M(sκ + 1)
 ∀κ∈K, x∈R.
(CCGfeasrisk(ι))
The following proposition enables us to bound the optimality gap associated with a given feasible solution
to the relaxed master problem.
Proposition 2. Let ι be feasible in the relaxed master problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)). Then, ι is feasible in Prob-
lem (P˜Koff,risk) and the objective value of ι in Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is given by the optimal objective value of
Problem (CCGfeasrisk(ι)). If R has fixed finite cardinality, then Problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) can be solved as an
MBLP using off-the-shelf solvers.
Proposition 2 implies that, for any ι feasible in the relaxed master problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)), the optimal
value of (CCGfeasrisk(ι)) yields a lower bound to the optimal value of Problem (P˜Koff,risk). At the same time,
it is evident that for any index set S ′ ⊆ S˜K , the optimal value of Problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) yields an upper
bound to the optimal objective value of Problem (P˜Koff,risk). The lemma below is key to identify indices of
subproblems s∈ S˜K that are infeasible.
Lemma 3. The relaxed master problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is always feasible. If (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is solvable,
let (τ, ι,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S˜) be an optimal solution. Else, if (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is unbounded, set τ =∞ and let
ι∈ CK be such that (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is unbounded when ι is fixed to that value. Moreover, let (θ,{ux}x∈R,s)
be optimal in Problem (CCGfeasrisk(ι)). Then, the following hold:
(i) θ≤ τ ;
(ii) If θ= τ , then Problem (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι)) is feasible for all s∈ S˜K;
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Algorithm 2: Column-and-Constraint Generation procedure for solving Problem (P˜Koff,risk).
Inputs: Optimality tolerance δ, comparison set C, and recommendation set R;
Initial uncertainty set U0 and number of queries K;
Output: Query ι? from CK , near optimal in Problem (P˜Koff,risk) with associated objective θ;
Initialization: ι?←∅; Upper and lower bounds: UB←+∞ and LB←−∞;
Initialize index set: S ′←∅;
while UB−LB> δ do
Solve the master problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)). If it is solvable, let (τ, ι,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S′) be an optimal
solution. If it is unbounded, set τ =∞ and let ι∈ CK be such that (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is unbounded
when ι is fixed to that value;
Set UB← τ ;
Solve the feasibility subproblem (CCGfeasrisk(ι)). Let (θ,{ux}x∈R,s) denote an optimal solution;
Set LB← θ;
if θ < τ then
S ′←S ′ ∪{s};
end
end
Set ι?← ι;
Result: Collection of queries ι? near-optimal in (P˜Koff,risk) with objective value θ.
(iii) If θ < τ , then scenario s corresponds to an infeasible subproblem, i.e., Problem (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι)) is
infeasible.
Remark 2. A solution ι ∈ CK such that (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is unbounded when ι is fixed to that value can be
readily obtained by augmenting formulation (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) with an artificial (large) upper bound on τ and
solving for an optimal query in that restricted problem.
Propositions 2 and Lemma 3 culminate in Algorithm 2 whose convergence is guaranteed by the following
theorem.
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Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 terminates in a final number of steps with a feasible solution to Problem (P˜Koff,risk).
The objective value attained by this solution is within δ of the optimal objective value of the problem.
In Section 8, we leverage Algorithm 2 and Theorem 3 to solve an active preference learning problem that
seeks to recommend housing allocation policies with highest possible worst-case utility.
4. Online Active Elicitation with the Max-Min Utility Decision Criterion
In Section 3, we assumed that all queries are chosen at once. However, in many settings of practical interest,
queries are made one at a time and the answer to each query is revealed before the next query is selected. In
this case, the recommender system has the opportunity to adjust their choice of queries, taking into account
the information acquired as a byproduct of previous queries and their answers. In this section, we address this
online active preference elicitation problem with the max-min utility decision criterion where comparisons
are selected adaptively over time. We also refer to this problem as the risk averse online active preference
elicitation problem.
4.1. Problem Formulation & Complexity Analysis
In the online risk averse recommendation problem, the sequence of events is as follows. First, the recommender
system selects K queries ικ ∈ CK , κ ∈K, one at a time. Each time a query ικ is made, and before the next
query ικ+1 is selected, the user selects an answer sκ ∈ S to query κ which the recommender system observes.
As in Section 3, we assume that the user is truthful and rational, see Assumption 1. We relax this assumption
later in Section 6. Thus, the sequence of answers given by the user must comply with at least one element u
from U0. We will relax this assumption later in Section 6. After having observed the answer to the first κ
queries, the recommender system can assert that the utility vector U of the user lies in the set
Uκ (ι[κ],s[κ]) :=

u∈ U0 : u>(xιk1 −xιk2 )> 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , κ} : sk = 1
u>(xι
k
1 −xιk2 ) = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , κ} : sk = 0
u>(xι
k
1 −xιk2 )< 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , κ} : sk =−1

,
where ι[κ] := {ιk}κk=1 and s[κ] := {sk}κk=1 denote the history of the first κ queries and answers, respectively.
Second, after the sequence of K queries and answers is complete, the recommender systems solves the
robust recommendation problem (Rrisk) and offers an item from R that is robust to all utility vectors in
UK (ι[K],s[K])= U(ι,s).
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Mathematically, the online risk averse recommendation problem is expressible as
max
ι1∈C
min
s1∈S1(ι1)
max
ι2∈C
min
s2∈S2(ι[2],s[1])
· · · max
ιK∈C
min
sK∈SK(ι[K],s[K−1])
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x, (PKon,risk)
where
S1(ι1) := {s1 ∈ S | U1(ι1,s1) 6= ∅} and Sκ(ι[κ],s[κ−1]) := {sκ ∈ S | Uκ(ι[κ],s[κ]) 6= ∅}
for each κ∈K. Thus, S1(ι1) denotes the set of all answers to the first query that are compatible with some
u∈ U0. Accordingly, Sκ(ι[κ],s[κ−1]) denotes the set of all answers to query ικ compatible with some u∈ U0
and with the answers given to the first κ− 1 queries.
The online problem (PKon,risk) appears significantly more complicated to solve than its offline counterpart,
Problem (PKoff,risk), due to the K + 1 alternating max-min problems. The following theorem shows that,
similar to its offline counterpart, the online problem is generally NP-hard.
Theorem 4. Evaluating the objective function of Problem (PKon,risk) is NP-hard even if the sequence of
queries is fixed and static and the recommendation set R consists of only two elements.
4.2. Conservative Solution Approach: Constant Decision Rule and Folding Horizon
Problem (PKon,risk) can be reformulated equivalently as an MBLP by performing a sequence of interchanges
of max and min operators, resulting in an equivalent max-min-max-min problem, and subsequently using
techniques similar to those in Section 3.3. In the max-min-max-min formulation, the queries for any time κ∈
K are indexed by s[κ−1] and become decision variables of the outermost maximization problem. Unfortunately,
the resulting formulation is computationally prohibitive to solve due to the exponential number of decision
variables and constraints. Thus, in this section, we propose to follow a conservative solution approach based
on a decision rule approximation, in the spirit of modern robust optimization, see e.g., Ben-Tal et al. (2009),
Bertsimas et al. (2010), Gorissen et al. (2015).
To approximately solve the online risk averse preference elicitation problem (PKon,risk), we propose to solve
a sequence of offline risk averse preference elicitation problems of the form (P˜κoff,risk), κ = K, . . . ,1, in a
folding horizon fashion. Thus, for fixed κ∈K and given the sequence of queries and answers ι[κ−1] and s[κ−1],
the κth query is selected randomly among the set of K−κ+1 queries that are optimal to make in the offline
preference elicitation problem with uncertainty set Uκ−1(ι[κ−1],s[κ−1]). Once a query ικ is made and the
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answer sκ to the query is observed, the uncertainty set is updated and a new instance of the offline problem
is solved with a “smaller” planning horizon and “smaller” uncertainty set. The process is repeated until K
queries have been made at which point an item is offered to the user that is optimal in Problem (Rrisk).
Note that to select a query at each period, we are effectively approximating the query selection decisions by
constant decision rules, while we are still allowing the recommendation made to be fully adjustable. We thus
obtain a conservative approximation to Problem (PKon,risk). The idea of approximating adjustable variables by
decision rules of benign complexity is very popular in the stochastic and robust optimization communities,
see e.g., Ben-Tal et al. (2004), Kuhn et al. (2009), Bertsimas et al. (2011), Bertsimas and Goyal (2012),
Vayanos et al. (2012), Bertsimas and De Ruiter (2016), Zhen et al. (2016), Xu and Burer (2018), Bodur and
Luedtke (2018). As we will see in our numerical experiments, see Section 8, although this approximation
is conservative, it significantly outperforms the state of the art approaches from the literature. This is not
surprising: our choice of queries is informed by the structure of the downstream recommendation problem.
This is in sharp contrast to existing approaches from the literature, where the queries are chosen based on
an “information gain” criterion and the choice of query is not informed by the structure of the set R.
5. Active Elicitation with the Min-Max Regret Decision Criterion
In Sections 3 and 4, we assumed that the decision-maker is risk averse. In this section, we instead take the
point of view of a regret averse decision-maker. We address the offline active preference elicitation problem
with the min-max regret decision criterion, which we also refer to as the regret averse offline active preference
elicitation problem, in Sections 5.1-5.4. We study the online regret averse preference elicitation problem in
Section 5.5.
5.1. Active Offline Elicitation with the Min-Max Regret Decision Criterion
In the regret averse offline active preference elicitation problem, the sequence of events is as follows. First,
the recommender system selects K queries ικ ∈ C, κ ∈ K, to ask the user. Subsequently, the user, who
has a true (but unknown) utility vector u? from U0, responds to the queries truthfully and rationally (see
Assumption 1) by selecting answers sκ to each query ι
κ in a way that complies with their utility vector u?.
As in the risk averse case, the utility vector u? is not observable to the recommender system; only the
answers to the questions are. Once the answers to the queries are observed, the recommender system can
certify that u? ∈ U(ι,s) and solves the regret averse recommendation problem (Rregret).
32 Vayanos, McElfresh, Ye, Dickerson, Rice: Active Preference Elicitation via Robust Optimization
Mathematically, the regret averse offline preference elicitation problem is expressible as the following two-
stage robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery
minimize
ι∈CK
max
s∈S(ι)
min
x∈R
max
u∈U(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
. (PKoff,regret)
The following lemma shows that, in a manner paralleling the risk averse case, Problem (PKoff,regret) can be
considerably simplified by eliminating the dependence of S(ι) on ι, by dropping the “indifferent” scenarios,
and by replacing the strict inequalities in the set U(ι,s) by their loose counterparts.
Lemma 4. Problem (PKoff,regret) is equivalent to
minimize
ι∈CK
max
s∈S˜K
min
x∈R
max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
, (P˜Koff,regret)
in the sense that the two problems have the same optimal objective value and the same sets of optimal
solutions.
Next, we show that Problem (P˜Koff,regret) is generally NP-hard when the recommendation set is discrete,
which motivates the integer programming based reformulations we provide in the next sections.
Theorem 5. Evaluating the objective function of Problem (P˜Koff,regret) is NP-hard even if the recommenda-
tion set R consists of only two elements.
Motivated by the complexity results above, we provide an enumeration-based approach for solving (P˜Koff,regret)
in Section 5.2 applicable to cases where K is small. We provide a general, MBLP reformulation of Prob-
lem (P˜Koff,regret) in Section 5.3 and a column-and-constraint generation approach in Section 5.4. These are
motivated by settings where K is larger (in the order of 8 to 10). Throughout the remainder of this section,
we make the assumption that the set R has fixed finite cardinality.
5.2. An Enumeration-Based Solution Approach for Small K
In the case of a small number of queries K, our approach relies on the following proposition.
Vayanos, McElfresh, Ye, Dickerson, Rice: Active Preference Elicitation via Robust Optimization 33
Algorithm 3: Enumeration-based algorithm for solving (P˜Koff,regret) for moderate values of K.
Input: Comparison set C, recommendation set R, uncertainty set U0, number of queries K;
Output: Optimal query ι? from CK ;
Initialization: ι?←∅; OPT←+∞;
for ι∈ CK do
foreach s∈ S˜K do
OPT(ι,s)← optimal objective of Problem (7);
end
if max
s∈S˜K
OPT(ι,s)<OPT then
OPT ← max
s∈S˜K
OPT(ι,s); ι?← ι;
end
end
Proposition 3. For any fixed ι ∈ CK and s ∈ S˜K, the regret averse recommendation problem (Rregret) is
equivalent to the minimization problem
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, x∈R
αx
′ ∈RK− , βx′ ∈RM−
θ ≥ b>βx′∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αx′κ +B>βx
′
=x′−x

∀x′ ∈R,
(7)
whose size is polynomial in the size of the input. Problem (7) is an MBLP if R has fixed finite cardinality.
Similar to the max-min utility case, if K is small, we leverage Proposition 3 and the moderate cardinality
of CK and S˜K to devise an enumeration-based algorithm for solving Problem (P˜Koff,regret). For each ι ∈ CK ,
we solve 2K instances of Problem (7) (one for each element s of S˜K) and record the maximum value of the
objective over these instances. The optimal solution to Problem (P˜Koff,regret) is given by the choice of ι that
gives the smallest maximum value. The total number of problems solved is (2|C|)K and enumeration can thus
be done efficiently if K is small (and I is not too large). The steps to follow are summarized in Algorithm 3.
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5.3. Exact MBLP Reformulation
As in the max-min utility case, the enumeration approach from Section 5.2 will not scale to realistic values
of K (8 to 10). In this section, we thus propose an exact MBLP reformulation for Problem (P˜Koff,regret),
which enables us to select queries optimally even when K is large by leveraging techniques from integer
optimization to speed-up computation and circumvent complete enumeration (see also Section 7).
Lemma 5. Problem (P˜Koff,regret) is equivalent to the following finite program
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM−
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s)∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )α(x′,s)κ +B>β(x
′,s) =x′−xs

∀s∈ S˜K , ∀x′ ∈R,
(8)
where ι denotes the queries to make and xs the items to recommend in response scenario s∈ S˜K.
Next, we convert Problem (8) to a finite mixed-binary linear program by following a similar approach to
that described in Section 3.3. The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Problem (8) is equivalent to the following mixed-binary linear program
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, vκ, wκ ∈ {0,1}I , κ∈K
xs ∈R ∀s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM− ∀s∈ S˜K , x′ ∈R
v(x
′,s)κ, w(x
′,s)κ ∈RI− ∀s∈ S˜K , x′ ∈R, κ∈K
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s)∑
i∈I
xi
∑
κ∈K
sκ
(
v
(x′,s)κ
i −w(x
′,s)κ
i
)
+B>β(x
′,s) = x′−xs

∀s∈ S˜K ,
x′ ∈R
e>vκ = 1, e>wκ = 1, 1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I, ∀κ∈K
v(x
′,s)κ ≥ −Mvκ, v(x′,s)κ ≥ α(x′,s)κ e
v(x
′,s)κ ≤ α(x′,s)κ e+M(e−vκ)
w(x
′,s)κ ≥ −Mwκ, w(x′,s)κ ≥ α(x′,s)κ e
w(x
′,s)κ ≤ α(x′,s)κ e+M(e−wκ)

∀s∈ S˜K , x′ ∈R,
κ∈K,
(9)
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where M is a “big-M” constant. In particular, given an optimal solution (τ,v,w,α,β,v,w) to Problem (9),
an optimal set of queries for the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem is given by
ικ1 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (vκi = 1) and ικ2 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (wκi = 1) , κ∈K.
The first and second sets of constraints in Problem (9) originate from the first two constraints in (8). The
third set of constraints ensure that ικ ∈ C for all κ. The remaining constraints are used to linearize the
products vκα(x
′,s)
κ and w
κα(x
′,s)
κ . Reformulation (9) is very attractive as it enables us to solve the regret
averse offline preference elicitation problem (PKoff,regret) as an MBLP using off-the-shelf solvers. For fixed K,
Problem (9) is polynomial in the size of the input. Yet, it is exponential in K. In the next section, we propose
a column-and-constraint generation approach, similar to the one proposed in Section 3.4 for the max-min
utility case, that enables us to scale to practical values of K.
5.4. Column-and-Constraint Generation
Problem (9) presents a number of decision variables and constraints that are exponential in K. Similar to the
max-min utility case (see Section 3.4), we leverage the robust nature of the problem and propose a column-
and-constraint generation algorithm to speed-up computation. We describe our column-and-constraint gen-
eration procedure using the finite program (8). Naturally, all problems solved would need to be converted
to MBLPs first, using techniques similar to those employed in Theorem 6. We omit these conversions to
streamline presentation.
We define the relaxed master problem parameterized by the index set S ′ ⊆ S˜K
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM−
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s)∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )α(x′,s)κ +B>β(x
′,s) = x′−xs

∀s∈ S ′,
x′ ∈R.
(CCGmasterregret (S ′))
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This problem only involves a subset of the decision variables and constraints of Problem (8) (those indexed
by s ∈ S ′ ⊆ S˜K). Given variables (τ, ι) feasible in the master problem, we define the (x′,s)th subproblem,
x′ ∈R, s∈ S˜K , through
minimize 0
subject to α∈RK− , β ∈RM− , x∈R
τ ≥ b>β∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β = x′−x.
(CCGsub,(x′,s)regret (τ, ι))
To identify indices of subproblems (CCGsub,(x′,s)regret (τ, ι)) that, given a solution (τ, ι) to the relaxed master
problem, are infeasible, we solve a single feasibility MBLP defined through
maximize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K
x′,x ∈R, ux ∈RJ ∀x∈R
θ ≤ (ux)>(x′,x−x) ∀x∈R
(ux)>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≥ −M(1− sκ)
(ux)>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≤ M(sκ + 1)
 ∀x∈R.
(CCGfeasregret(ι))
Proposition 4. Let ι be feasible in the relaxed master problem (CCGmasterregret (S ′)). Then, ι is feasible in Prob-
lem (P˜Koff,regret) and the objective value of ι in Problem (P˜Koff,regret) is given by the optimal objective value of
Problem (CCGfeasregret(ι)). Moreover, if the set R has fixed finite cardinality, then Problem (CCGfeasregret(ι)) is a
mixed-binary linear program of size polynomial in the size of the input.
Lemma 6. The relaxed master problem (CCGmasterregret (S ′)) is always feasible. If (CCGmasterregret (S ′)) is solvable, let
(τ, ι,{α(x′,s),β(x′,s)}x′∈R,s∈S′ ,{xs}s∈S′) be an optimal solution. Else, if (CCGmasterregret (S ′)) is unbounded, set
τ =−∞ and let ι ∈ CK be such that (CCGmasterregret (S ′)) is unbounded when ι is fixed to that value. Moreover,
let (θ,{ux,x′,x}x∈R,s) be optimal in Problem (CCGfeasregret(ι)). Then, the following hold:
(i) θ≥ τ ;
(ii) If θ= τ , then Problem (CCGsub,(x′,s)regret (τ, ι)) is feasible for all x′ ∈R and s∈ S˜K;
(iii) If θ > τ , then there exists x′ ∈R such that the pair (x′,s) corresponds to an infeasible subproblem, i.e.,
Problem (CCGsub,(x′,s)regret (τ, ι)) is infeasible.
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Algorithm 4: Column-and-Constraint Generation procedure for solving Problem (P˜Koff,regret).
Inputs: Optimality tolerance δ, comparison set C, and recommendation set R;
Initial uncertainty set U0 and number of queries K;
Output: Query ι? from CK , near optimal in Problem (P˜Koff,regret) with associated objective θ;
Initialization: ι?←∅; Upper and lower bounds: UB←+∞ and LB←−∞;
Initialize index set: S ′←∅;
while UB−LB> δ do
Solve the master problem (CCGmasterregret (S ′)). If it is solvable, let
(τ, ι,{α(x′,s),β(x′,s)}x′∈R,s∈S′ ,{xs}s∈S′) be an optimal solution. If it is unbounded, set τ =−∞
and let ι∈ CK be such that (CCGmasterregret (S ′)) is unbounded when ι is fixed to that value;
Set LB← τ ;
Solve feasibility subproblem (CCGfeasregret(ι)). Let (θ,{ux,x′,x}x∈R,s) denote an optimal solution;
Set UB← θ;
if θ > τ then
S ′←S ′ ∪{s}
end
end
Set ι?← ι;
Result: Collection of queries ι? near-optimal in (P˜Koff,regret) with objective value θ.
Propositions 4 and Lemma 6 culminate in Algorithm 4 whose convergence is guaranteed by the following
theorem.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 4 terminates in a final number of steps with a feasible solution to the regret averse
active preference elicitation Problem (P˜Koff,regret). The objective value attained by this solution is within δ of
the optimal objective value of the problem.
5.5. Active Online Elicitation with the Min-Max Regret Decision Criterion
In Sections 5.1-5.4, we assumed that all queries are chosen at once. In many settings of practical interest,
queries are selected one at a time and the answer to each query is revealed before the next query is selected.
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In this case, the recommender system has the opportunity to adjust the queries made, taking into account
the answers to past queries. In this section, we address this regret averse online active preference elicitation
problem (also referred to as online active preference elicitation problem with the max-min utility decision
criterion) where comparisons are selected adaptively over time.
Mathematically, the online regret averse recommendation problem is expressible as
max
ι1∈C
min
s1∈S1(ι1)
· · · max
ιK∈C
min
sK∈SK(ι[K],s[K−1])
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
. (PKon,regret)
As in the max-min utility case, we propose to approximate the adaptive query decisions by constant decision
rules, allowing the recommendation decisions to be fully-adaptive, and solving the problem in a folding
horizon fashion, see Section 4.2.
6. Active Preference Elicitation under Inconsistent Responses
In this section, we generalize all the ideas in the paper to cases where the user may be boundedly rational,
giving answers that are inconsistent with Assumptions 1 and 2.
6.1. Inconsistencies Model
So far, we have assumed that users are perfectly rational and maximize the expectation of a utility in the spirit
of expected utility theory, as claimed by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), see Assumption 1. Yet, several
authors have disputed this claim and shown that oftentimes, individuals behave in seemingly “irrational”
ways, see e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman et al. (1991), Allais (1953). In particular, these
works have shown that, when describing their preferences, users may give answers that are inconsistent and
could be influenced by the framing of the question. In addition, we have assumed that the user utility function
is linear with known attributes, see Assumption 2. While this assumption is very common in the literature,
it may not necessarily hold true in practice. Therefore, in this section, we relax Assumptions 1 and 2.
Noisy/inconsistent responses have been investigated in the literature in the context of polyhedral methods
to preference elicitation, see e.g., Toubia et al. (2003) and Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013). Our approach differs
from these works in that we are able to integrate the learning and the downstream optimization, while still
taking into account the possibility of inconsistencies in the user responses.
We propose to capture the possibility that user responses are inconsistent or incompatible with the
assumptions made by interpreting user responses with some “reservation”. We take the viewpoint that,
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when comparing (the utility of) items ικ1 and ι
κ
2 , κ∈K, user answers are perturbed by additive noise. Thus,
rather than being based on the sign of the difference (U >xι
κ
1 −U >xικ2 ), their answer is based on the sign
of (U >xι
κ
1 −U >xικ2 +Eκ), where E ∈RK is a vector of independent identically distributed errors. This idea
is similar in spirit to that originally proposed by Toubia et al. (2003).
In line with modern robust optimization, see e.g., Ben-Tal et al. (2009), Bertsimas et al. (2010), Gorissen
et al. (2015), we model the random parameters E as decision variables  constrained to lie in an uncertainty
set, which we denote by EΓ. Under this model, we relax Assumptions 1 and 2 as follows.
Assumption 4 (Noisy Preferences). We assume that the user preferences over items satisfy:
1. If x y, then U (x)−U (y) +Eκ ≥ 0; and
2. If x∼ y, then |U (x)−U (y)| ≤ Eκ.
Moreover, the user assumed utility function u : X → R is expressible as u(x) := U >x for some (random)
vector U supported in the non-empty and bounded uncertainty set U0 := {u∈RJ |Bu≥ b} for some (known)
matrix B ∈ RM×J and vector b ∈ RM . The user inconsistencies across K queries are assumed to lie in the
uncertainty set EΓ := {∈RK+ :
∑
κ∈K κ ≤ Γ} for some (known) parameter Γ∈R+.
Note that Assumption 4 directly generalizes Assumptions 1 and 2. Indeed, when Γ = 0, Assumption 4 reduces
to Assumptions 1 and 2. Uncertainty sets of the type EΓ are very popular in the literature, see e.g., Bandi
and Bertsimas (2012). The assumption on EΓ can easily be relaxed to merely requiring that EΓ be a bounded
full-dimensional polyhedron.
6.2. Risk Averse & Regret Averse Recommendations under Inconsistent Responses
Given the sequences ι ∈ CK and s ∈ S˜K of questions and answers, the recommender system offers the item
with the maximum worst-case (minimum) utility for any u ∈ UΓ(ι,s). Under Assumption 4, the risk averse
recommendation problem reads
maximize
x∈R
min
u∈UΓ(ι,s)
u>x, (RΓrisk)
where,
UΓ(ι,s) :=

u∈ U0 : ∃∈ EΓ such that
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≥ −κ ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
|u>(xικ1 −xικ2 )| ≤ κ ∀κ∈K : sκ = 0
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≤ κ ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1

.
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Accordingly, the regret averse recommendation problem is expressible as
minimize
x∈R
max
u∈UΓ(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
. (RΓregret)
6.3. Offline Risk Averse Active Preference Elicitation under Inconsistencies
The offline risk averse recommendation problem with inconsistencies is expressible as the following two-stage
robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery
maximize
ι∈CK
min
s∈SΓ(ι)
max
x∈R
min
u∈UΓ(ι,s)
u>x, (PΓ,Koff,risk)
where SΓ(ι) := {s∈ SK | UΓ(ι,s) 6= ∅} denotes the set of all answers compatible with some u ∈ U0 and
 ∈ EΓ. As before, we can simplify the problem above by eliminating the dependence of SΓ(ι) on ι and by
noting that “indifferent” answers can always be omitted. In the case of a moderate number of queries K,
we can leverage the following proposition to solve the risk averse active preference elicitation problem with
inconsistencies (PΓ,Koff,risk) by enumeration, in a way that parallels Algorithm 1.
Proposition 5. For any fixed ι∈ CK and s∈ S˜K, the robust recommendation problem (RΓrisk) is equivalent
to the maximization problem
maximize b>β+ Γµ
subject to x∈R, α∈RK+ , β ∈RM+ , µ∈R−∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β = x
α+µe ≤ 0,
(10)
whose size is polynomial in the size of the input. Problem (10) is a linear program if R is polyhedral and a
mixed-binary linear program if R also involves integrality constraints.
When K is larger than 2 or 3, solving Problem (PΓ,Koff,risk) by enumeration becomes computationally pro-
hibitive. In such settings, the following lemma and theorem can be leveraged to solve (PΓ,Koff,risk) as an MBLP.
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Lemma 7. Problem (PΓ,Koff,risk) is equivalent to the following finite program
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK
xs ∈R, αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , µs ∈R−
τ ≤ b>βs + Γµs∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αsκ +B>β = x
αs +µse ≤ 0

∀s∈ S˜K ,
(11)
where ι denotes the queries to make and xs the items to recommend in response scenario s∈ S˜K.
Theorem 8. Problem (11) is equivalent to the following mixed-binary linear program
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, vκ, wκ ∈ {0,1}I , κ∈K
αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , µs ∈R−, xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
vsκ, wsκ ∈RI+, s∈ S˜K , κ∈K
τ ≤ b>βs + Γµs∑
i∈I
xi
∑
κ∈K
sκ (v
sκ
i −wsκi ) +B>βs = xs
αs +µse ≤ 0

∀s∈ S˜K
e>vκ = 1, e>wκ = 1, 1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I ∀κ∈K
vsκ ≤ Mvκ, vsκ ≤ αsκe, vsκ ≥ αsκe−M(e−vκ)
wsκ ≤ Mwκ, wsκ ≤ αsκe, wsκ ≥ αsκe−M(e−wκ)

∀s∈ S˜K
κ∈K,
(12)
where M is a “big-M” constant. In particular, given an optimal solution (τ,v,w,α,β,x,{µs}s∈S˜K ,v,w) to
Problem (12), an optimal set of queries for the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem is given by
ικ1 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (vκi = 1) and ικ2 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (wκi = 1) , κ∈K.
The interpretation of the constraints is similar to the case without inconsistencies discussed in Section 5.3.
Problem (12) can be solved using a column-and-constraint generation procedure similar to that proposed in
Section 3.4 for the case without inconsistencies. Here, we only provide the master problem, the feasibility
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subproblem, and the algorithm. To minimize notational overhead, we describe our column-and-constraint
generation procedure using the finite program (11). The relaxed master problem is
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK
αs+ ∈RK , βs ∈RM+ , µs ∈R−, xs ∈R
τ ≤ b>βs + Γµs∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αsκ +B>βs = xs
αs +µse ≤ 0

∀s∈ S ′,
(CCGmasterrisk,Γ (S˜))
where S ′ ⊆ S˜K . To identify indices s that, given a solution (τ, ι) to the relaxed master problem, are violated,
we solve a single feasibility MBLP defined through
min θ
s. t. θ ∈R, ∈RK+ , ux ∈ U0 ∀x∈R, s∈ S˜K
θ ≥ (ux)>x ∀x∈R
(ux)>(xιk −xι′k) + κ ≥ −M(1− sκ)
(ux)>(xιk −xι′k)− κ ≤ M(sκ + 1)∑
κ∈K
κ ≤ Γ

∀κ∈K ∀x∈R.
(CCGfeasrisk,Γ(ι))
Similar to the noiseless setting, the master and feasibility subproblems can be used to solve Problem (PΓ,Koff,risk)
iteratively, as summarized in the following Theorem.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 2 with (PΓ,Koff,risk) in place of (PKoff,risk), (CCGmasterrisk,Γ (S˜)) in place of (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)),
and (CCGfeasrisk,Γ(ι)) in place of (CCGfeasrisk(ι)) terminates in a final number of steps with a feasible solution to
Problem (PΓ,Koff,risk). The objective value attained by this solution is within δ of the optimal objective value of
the problem.
6.4. Offline Regret Averse Active Preference Elicitation under Inconsistencies
The offline regret averse active preference elicitation problem with inconsistencies is expressible as the fol-
lowing two-stage robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery
minimize
ι∈CK
max
s∈SΓ(ι)
min
x∈R
max
u∈UΓ(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
. (PΓ,Koff,regret)
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As before, we can simplify the problem above by eliminating the dependence of SΓ(ι) on ι and by noting
that “indifferent” answers can always be omitted.
In the case of a moderate number of queries K, we can leverage the following proposition to solve
Problem (PΓ,Koff,regret) by enumeration using the regret averse recommendation problem with inconsisten-
cies (RΓregret), in a way that parallels Algorithm 3.
Proposition 6. For any fixed ι∈ CK and s∈ S˜K, the regret averse recommendation problem with inconsis-
tencies (RΓregret) is equivalent to the minimization problem
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, x∈R
αx
′ ∈RK− , βx′ ∈RM− , µx′ ∈R+
θ ≥ b>βx′ + Γµx′∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αx′κ +B>βx
′
= x′−x
αx
′
+µx
′
e ≥ 0

∀x′ ∈R,
(13)
whose size is polynomial in the size of the input. Problem (13) is an MBLP if R has fixed finite cardinality.
When K is larger than 2 or 3, solving Problem (PΓ,Koff,regret) by enumeration is computationally prohibitive.
In such settings, the following lemma and theorem can be leveraged to solve (PΓ,Koff,regret) as an MBLP.
Lemma 8. Problem (PΓ,Koff,regret) is equivalent to the following finite program
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM− , µ(x′,s) ∈R+
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s) + Γµ(x′,s)∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )α(x′,s)κ +B>β(x
′,s) =x′−xs
α(x
′,s) +µ(x
′,s)e ≥ 0

∀s∈ S˜K , ∀x′ ∈R,
(14)
where ι denotes the queries to make and xs the items to recommend in response scenario s∈ S˜K.
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Theorem 10. Problem (14) is equivalent to the following mixed-binary linear program
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, vκ, wκ ∈ {0,1}I , κ∈K
xs ∈R ∀s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM− , µ(x′,s) ∈R+ ∀s∈ S˜K , x′ ∈R
v(x
′,s)κ, w(x
′,s)κ ∈RI− ∀s∈ S˜K , x′ ∈R, κ∈K
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s) + Γµ(x′,s)∑
i∈I
xi
∑
κ∈K
sκ
(
v
(x′,s)κ
i −w(x
′,s)κ
i
)
+B>β(x
′,s) = x′−xs
α(x
′,s) +µ(x
′,s)e ≥ 0

∀s∈ S˜K ,
x′ ∈R
e>vκ = 1, e>wκ = 1, 1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I, ∀κ∈K
v(x
′,s)κ ≥ −Mvκ, v(x′,s)κ ≥ α(x′,s)κ e
v(x
′,s)κ ≤ α(x′,s)κ e+M(e−vκ)
w(x
′,s)κ ≥ −Mwκ, w(x′,s)κ ≥ α(x′,s)κ e
w(x
′,s)κ ≤ α(x′,s)κ e+M(e−wκ)

∀s∈ S˜K , x′ ∈R,
κ∈K,
(15)
where M is a “big-M” constant. In particular, given an optimal solution (τ,v,w,α,β,x,{µs}s∈S˜K ,v,w) to
Problem (15), an optimal set of queries for the risk averse offline preference elicitation problem is given by
ικ1 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (vκi = 1) and ικ2 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (wκi = 1) , κ∈K.
Problem (15) can be solved using a column-and-constraint generation procedure similar to that proposed
in Section 5.4 for the case without inconsistencies. Here, we only provide the master problem, the feasibility
subproblem, and the algorithm. The relaxed master problem is
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM− , µ(x′,s) ∈R+
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s) + Γµ(x′,s) ∈R+∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )α(x′,s)κ +B>β(x
′,s) = xs−x′
α(x
′,s) +µ(x
′,s)e ≥ 0

∀s∈ S ′,
x′ ∈R′,
(CCGmasterregret,Γ(S˜))
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where S ′ ⊆ S˜K . To identify indices s that, given a solution (τ, ι) to the relaxed master problem, are violated,
we solve a single feasibility MBLP defined through
min θ
s. t. θ ∈R, ∈RK+ , ux ∈ U0 ∀x∈R, s∈ S
K
θ ≥ (ux)>x ∀x∈R
(ux)>(xιk −xι′k) + κ ≥ −M(1− sκ)
(ux)>(xιk −xι′k)− κ ≤ M(sκ + 1)∑
κ∈K
κ ≤ Γ

∀κ∈K ∀x∈R.
(CCGfeasregret,Γ(ι))
Theorem 11. Algorithm 4 with (PΓ,Koff,regret) in place of (PKoff,regret), (CCGmasterregret,Γ(S˜)) in place of
(CCGmasterregret,Γ(S˜)), and (CCGfeasregret,Γ(ι)) in place of (CCGfeasregret(ι)) terminates in a final number of steps with
a feasible solution to Problem (PΓ,Koff,regret). The objective value attained by this solution is within δ of the
optimal objective value of the problem.
7. Speed-up Strategies
In this section, we propose two complementary strategies for speeding up solution of the mixed-binary linear
programming reformulations of the active preference elicitation problems (Problems (6),(9),(12), and (15)).
The first one aims to break the symmetry in the problem and the second adds warm starts.
7.1. Symmetry Breaking
In the finite programming reformulations (5),(8),(11), and (14) of Problems (PKoff,risk),(PKoff,regret),(PΓ,Koff,risk),
and (PΓ,Koff,regret), every permutation of the queries ι will yield another solution with the same objective
function value. Indeed, since all queries are asked simultaneously, the index of a query does not impact
the answer of the user to the query. Correspondingly, Problems (6),(9),(12), and (15) also present several
symmetric solutions: we can permute the indices κ in the pairs {(vκ,wκ)}κ∈K to build solutions with the
same objective. This symmetry increases the size of the search space and therefore, time is spent visiting
solutions which are symmetric to the ones already visited in the search tree. To speed-up solution time, we
propose to augment the MBLP formulations with symmetry breaking constraints which eliminate symmetric
solutions from the search space while preserving at least one solution from each equivalence class.
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To build the symmetry breaking constraints, note that each comparison is uniquely defined by the binary
vector
yκ = vκ +wκ, (16)
which has exactly two nonzero elements – corresponding to the items used in the comparison. To break this
symmetry, we require that the binary vectors {yκ}κ∈K be lexicographically ordered : if yκi = yκ+1i for all i < j,
and yκj 6= yκ+1j , then yκj = 0 and yκ+1j = 1. To enforce lexicographic ordering, we introduce, in addition to yκ,
the binary variables zκκ
′ ∈ {0,1}I , which satisfy zκκ′i = 1 if and only if yκi 6= yκ′i , i ∈ I. These variables can
be uniquely defined using the following linear constraints
zκκ
′ ≤ yκ +yκ′
zκκ
′ ≤ 2−yκ−yκ′
zκκ
′ ≥ yκ−yκ′
zκκ
′ ≥ yκ′ −yκ

∀κ, κ′ ∈K : κ< κ′. (17)
Lexicographic ordering can then be imposed by adding to all MBLP problems the constraints
yκ
′
i ≥ yκi −
∑
i′∈I:i′<i
zκκ
′
i′ ∀i∈ I, κ,κ′ ∈K : κ< κ′. (18)
Next, note that in the preference elicitation problems, there is no benefit in asking the same query twice:
the worst-case utility can only improve by making different queries. Correspondingly, we can add to all
MBLP problems the following constraints
∑
i∈I
zκ,κ
′
i ≥ 1 ∀κ,κ′ ∈K : κ< κ′, (19)
which eliminate solutions that involve asking the same queries twice.
As we will see in Section 8, the symmetry breaking constraints (16)-(18), and (19) translate to a significant
reduction in solver times.
7.2. Warm-Starts
Simultaneously to the first speed-up strategy discussed in Section 7.1, solution times can be further reduced
by employing warm starts. In particular, solutions obtained for lower values of K (smaller numbers of queries)
can be used to warm start problems with more queries. In this section, we describe this procedure. We detail
how to build a feasible warm start for Problem (6) with K+1 queries from a feasible solution to Problem (6)
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with K queries. Recall that a warm start need only fix solutions for the binary decision variables in the
problem. The approach naturally also applies to MBLPs (9),(12), and (15).
Let ({τ,v,w,α,β,x,v,w) be feasible in Problem (6) with K queries. To generate a feasible solution to
Problem (6) with K+ 1 queries, we proceed as follows. First, we generate a new query ιK+1 randomly from
the set
C \
{
ι∈ C : ∃κ∈K : ικ1 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (vκi = 1) and ικ2 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (wκi = 1)
}
and define v˜ and w˜ through v˜κ := vκ, w˜κ :=wκ, κ ∈K, v˜K+1i := I
(
ιK+11 = i
)
, and w˜K+1i := I
(
ιK+12 = i
)
for
each i∈ I. Subsequently, for each s∈ S˜K+1, we define x˜s := x(s1,...,sK). Then, (v˜, w˜, x˜) constitutes a warm
start for Problem (6) with K + 1 queries. The solution hereby constructed asks one additional (random)
query and subsequently ignores the answer to the query in the choice of recommendation. It can be shown
that it attains an objective value in Problem (6) with K + 1 queries at least as high as that attained by
(τ,v,w,α,β,x,v,w) in Problem (6) with K queries. Note that if warm starts are combined with symmetry
breaking constraints, then the solution constructed needs to be permuted so as to satisfy lexicographical
ordering to ensure it satisfies the lexicographic constraints. This procedure is detailed in Algorithm 5. As
we will see in our numerical results, see Section 8, using warm starts in this fashion results in significant
speed-ups.
8. Numerical Results
In this section, we investigate the performance of our approach on both synthetic and real-world instances of
the offline and online max-min utility and min-max regret active preference elicitation problems introduced
in this paper. This section is organized as follows. In Sections 8.1 and 8.2, we describe the datasets that we
employ in our experiments. The experimental setup is described in Section 8.3. In Sections 8.4 and 8.5, we
present our numerical results on the synthetic and real datasets, respectively.
8.1. Description of the Synthetic Datasets
We generate synthetic datasets with varying numbers of items I ∈ {7,10,20,30,40,60} and features J ∈
{3,5,10,20}. Items xi are drawn uniformly at random from the J-dimensional sphere of radius ten. Through-
out our synthetic data experiments, we assume U0 = [−1,1]J .
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8.2. Description of the Real Dataset
We use real data from the HMIS database obtained from Ian De Jong8 as part of a working group called
“Youth Homelessness Data, Policy, Research.” The dataset tracks 10,922 homeless youth from 16 communi-
ties across the United States and presents 3,474 housing assignments. Each row in the dataset corresponds to
a youth that was waitlisted for housing. There are two types of housing resources: rapid rehousing (RRH) and
permanent supportive housing (PSH). Some individuals received services only (SO). For each individual, the
dataset presents their race/ethnicity, their TAY VI-SPDAT9 score, the housing resource they were allocated,
and the outcome of the intervention (whether they successfully exited homelessness for one year or longer).
We refer the reader to Chan et al. (2017) for more information on this dataset. We classify individuals into
31 classes based on their TAY VI-SPDAT score (1 through 16) and race (“White or Other” and “Black or
Hispanic”). We use logistic regression to learn the success probabilities for each class of individuals and for
each of the three interventions (PSH, RRH, SO).
Using this data, we build a dataset of I = 50 policies and their J = 21 outcomes/characteristics through
simulation. We now detail this procedure which proceeds in two steps: the generation of a policy and the
simulation of the performance of that policy based on historical data.
To generate policies, we propose to view the system as a multi-class multi-server queuing system under
a first come, first served (FCFS) priority rule. In particular, we think of the system as a bipartite graph
with one side of the graph collecting the classes (queues) of individuals of different types and the other side
collecting the servers where housing resources of different types are procured, see Figure 3. Thus, each queue
collects all individuals from the same class and each server procures housing resources of a single type. A link
between a server and a class in the bipartite graph indicates that individuals of this class can be matched
to resources procured by the server. When a resource is procured at a server, it is offered to the first person
to have arrived in any one of the queues eligible for service from this server (i.e., connected to this server).
If an individual is not matched to any resource, they are assumed to receive the SO intervention. A housing
allocation policy can then be uniquely defined through the topology of this bipartite graph. We generate
a set of I = 50 topologies as follows. The first topology corresponds to the first come, first served priority
discipline (i.e., a complete bipartite graph). The second topology corresponds to the current allocation policy:
individuals that score high (TAY VI-SPDAT greater or equal to 8) are waitlisted for PSH; individuals that
score medium (TAY VI-SPDAT in the range 4 to 7) are waitlisted for RRH; others receive service only. The
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Figure 3 Model of the housing allocation system as a bipartite graph. The policy associated with this bipartite
graph is “interpretable” in the sense that each queue is only matched to one server.
remaining topologies are generated at random. Half of the policies are interpretable in the sense that each
class can only be connected to one server –this ensures that individuals can be guided toward the appropriate
intervention upon entering the system. Whether a policy can use race or not as feature to assign housing is a
Bernoulli random variable. Topologies that comply with the interpretability and the use or not of protected
characteristics are then generated uniformly at random.
Once these 50 topologies have been generated, we simulate the historical performance of the corresponding
policy. In particular, for each topology, we simulate the interventions that would have been received by each
individual under this alternative policy and record the following attributes: a) the probability that any given
individual exits homelessness, overall, by race, by score range (hi, medium, low), and by race and score
range combined; b) the average treatment effect, by race, by score range (hi, medium), and by race and
score range combined; and c) whether the policy was interpretable, giving us a total of J = 21 features. For
the experiments on real data, we assume U0 = {u ∈ RJ+ : e>u = 1} in the spirit of conjoint analysis, see
Example 3.
8.3. Experimental Setup
We solve the offline elicitation problems (PKoff,risk), (PKoff,regret), (PΓ,Koff,risk), and (PΓ,Koff,regret) using the column-
and-constraint generation procedures discussed in Sections 3.4, 5.4, 6.3, and 6.4, respectively. The tolerance δ
used in the column-and-constraint generation algorithm is 1× 10−3. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we
augment all our formulations with the symmetry breaking constraints proposed in Section 7.1. To speed-up
computation further, we also employ a conservative greedy heuristic that uses the solution to problems with
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smaller K to solve problems with larger K more efficiently, see Section EC.4. This strategy enables us to run
a far larger number of experiments in a given time to showcase the performance of our approach in a variety
of settings. Without this conservative heuristic, the quality of the solutions obtained by our approach would
be higher than those reported in these experiments.
In the offline setting, we compare our elicitation approaches, which we refer to as E-OFF-MMU and E-OFF-MMR
for max-min utility and min-max regret cases, respectively, to random elicitation, which we denote by E-RAND.
For any fixed K, E-RAND selects K queries at random. To the best of our knowledge, no other solution
approach exists in the literature for identifying K queries to ask at once. For E-RAND, we sample 50 sets of K
random queries. We evaluate the worst-case utility (resp. worst-case regret) of any given choice of queries ι?,
which we denote by uwc(ι
?) (resp. rwc(ι
?)), by fixing ι= ι? in Problem (6) (resp. (9)) for the case without
inconsistencies and in Problem (12) (resp. (15)) for the case with inconsistencies. To speed-up this objective
function evaluation step, we employ a variant of the column-and-constraint generation procedure presented
in this paper. We omit the details in the interest of space. We investigate the role played by all speed-up
strategies and the suboptimality of the conservative heuristic approach at the end of Section 8.4.
In the online setting, we compare our conservative solution approaches, which we refer to as E-ON-MMU
and E-ON-MMR for the max-min utility and min-max regret cases, respectively, to various heuristics from
the literature. These approaches combine different elicitation and recommendation strategies. In terms of
elicitation, we investigate random query selection (denoted by E-RAND) and query selection using the analytic
center approach (denoted by E-AC) as in Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013) (which is reminiscent of the elicitation
approaches from Toubia et al. (2003) and Boutilier et al. (2006)). Note that in the case of inconsistencies,
we adapt the approach from Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013) to employ our uncertainty set to make for a fair
comparison. In terms of recommendation, we investigate analytic center based recommendation (denoted
by R-AC) (originally proposed by Toubia et al. (2003)) and robust recommendations based on the max-min
utility and min-max regret decision criteria (denoted by R-MMU and R-MMR), which we compute using our
reformulations (3), (7), (10), and (13), as appropriate. Thus, in the max-min utility case, we compare our
approach, E-ON-MMU/R-MMU to: E-AC/R-AC, E-AC/R-MMU, and E-RAND/R-MMU. In the min-max regret case,
we compare our approach, E-ON-MMR/R-MMR to: E-AC/R-AC, E-AC/R-MMR, and E-RAND/R-MMR. For the online
setting, we evaluate the performance of all approaches through simulation using 50 (resp. 13) true utility
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vectors u? for the synthetic (resp. real) dataset. The utility vectors are drawn uniformly at random from the J-
dimensional sphere of radius one. For each method (which is a tuple consisting of an elicitation approach and
a recommendation approach), we generate queries according to the elicitation approach, generate answers to
the queries using u?, and subsequently make a recommendation according to the recommendation approach.
We record the worst-case utility, worst-case regret, and rank of the recommended item.
In line with several recent papers in the robust optimization literature, see e.g., Bandi and Bertsimas (2012),
in the case of inconsistent responses, we employ uncertainty sets UΓ(s, ι), where Γ := ΓG(K)1/2 maxi∈I ‖xi‖1.
This definition ensures that the interpretation of ΓG and  remain consistent across experiments and inde-
pendent of the number of questions K and of the range of u>xi, i∈ I.
In order to facilitate an interpretation of the performance of our approach, we standardize the utilities
(regrets) of the recommended items. In the case of max-min utility, we standardize worst-case utilities such
that a standardized worst-case utility equal to zero (resp. one) corresponds to the worst-case utility of the
item recommended if no queries (resp. all queries) are asked. Mathematically, the normalized worst-case
utility associated with a choice of queries ι is calculated as
unwc(ι) =
uwc(ι)−u0wc
uallwc−u0wc
,
where u0wc (resp. u
all
wc) denote the worst-case utility of the item recommended if none (resp. all) queries are
asked. Thus, if after asking queries, recommendations are made according to R-MMU, then their normalized
worst-case utility will be in the range [0,1]. On the other hand, if recommendations are made in a way that
does not maximize worst-case utility (e.g., according to R-AC), then they may have a normalized worst-case
utility that is negative. We can then interpret the normalized worst-case utility as a percentage relative to
the full-information case (with 0% representing no information and 100% representing full-information). In
the case of min-max regret, we standardize the worst-case regrets such that a standardized worst-case regret
equal to one (resp. zero) corresponds to the worst-case regret of the item recommended if no queries (resp.
all queries) are asked. Mathematically, the normalized worst-case regret is calculated as
rnwc(ι) =
rwc(ι)− r0wc
rallwc− r0wc
,
where r0wc (resp. r
all
wc) denote the worst-case regret of the item recommended if no (resp. all) queries are
asked. Thus, if after asking queries, recommendations are made according to R-MMR, then their normalized
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worst-case regret will be in the range [0,1]. On the other hand, if recommendations are made in a way that
does not minimize worst-case regret, then they may have a normalized worst-case regret that is greater than
one. We can then interpret the normalized worst-case regret as a percentage relative to the no-information
case (with 100% representing no information and 0% representing full-information).
Across our experiments, we use smaller datasets for the regret averse case than for the risk averse case. The
reason is that we benchmark against random elicitation and evaluating the performance of a large number
of random queries becomes computationally prohibitive for large datasets in the regret averse case (more so
than in the risk averse case).
All of our experiments were performed on a Linux virtual machine (Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS), with 8GB RAM
and two Intel Xeon 2.6GHz cores. All linear optimization problems were solved using Gurobi version 9.0.0.
We use Mosek version 9.1.l0 to compute the analytic centers of polyhedra as required by E-AC and R-AC.
8.4. Numerical Results on Synthetic Data
Offline Preference Elicitation: Optimality and Scalability Results. In our first set of experiments, we eval-
uate the benefits of our offline approaches relative to random elicitation under both the max-min utility
and min-max regret decision criteria. The results are summarized on Figures 4 and 5 for the risk averse
case and on Figures 6 and 7 for the regret averse case. Figures 4 and 6 summarize optimality results, while
Figures 5 and 7 summarize computational performance. From Figure 4, we see that E-OFF-MMU consistently
outperforms E-RAND. In our experiments, E-OFF-MMU outperformed the median query from E-RAND by up to
52 percentage points (p.p.) in terms of normalized worst-case utility. Similarly, from Figure 6, we see that
E-OFF-MMR consistently outperforms E-RAND. In our experiments, E-OFF-MMR outperformed a median query
from E-RAND by up to 27 percentage points in terms of worst-case regret. Thus, selecting queries at random
almost always results in suboptimal performance. At the same time, from Figure 5, we see that evaluating
the performance of a single random query (which is only possible thanks to the techniques we propose in
this paper) takes on average 1.22 seconds (resp. 11.68 seconds) for max-min utility (resp. min-max regret)
objective. At the same time, given I and K, the total number of possible random queries amounts to
(
I(I−1)
K
)
,
which is in the order of 7e10 (resp. 1.8e5) for I = 60 and K = 10 (resp. I = 20 and K = 10), making it
prohibitive to evaluate the performance of all possible random queries to then select the best option. We
note that for a given problem size, computing the optimal set of queries in the the regret averse setting is
harder than in the risk averse setting.
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Figure 4 Optimality results for the offline risk averse active preference elicitation problem (PKoff,risk) on synthetic
data. Each label on the right of each facet corresponds to the characteristics of the instance solved
(I−J−Γ). For example, the first facet (subfigure (a)) is labeled 20–10–0.0, indicating an instance with
20 items, 10 features, and Γ = 0. On the first row (subfigures (a),(b), and (c)), we vary the number
of items. On the second row (subfigures (d),(e), and (f)), we vary the number of features. On the last
row (subfigures (g),(h), and (i)), we vary Γ. Approach E-OFF-MMU is shown with red dots. The median
performance of E-RAND across 50 sets of K random queries is shown with blue crosses. The blue shaded
region shows the range of performance of E-RAND across these 50 sets of queries.
Online Preference Elicitation: Optimality Results. In our second set of experiments, we evaluate the ben-
efits of our online approaches relative to existing approaches from the literature, see Section 8.3 for details.
Our results are summarized in Figures 8 and 9 for the max-min utility and min-max regret cases, respec-
tively. From the figures, it is apparent that E-ON-MMU/R-MMU and E-ON-MMR/R-MMR consistently outperform
all other elicitation/recommendation approaches. In particular, in the risk averse case, the greatest improve-
ment of E-ON-MMU/R-MMU over E-AC/R-AC, E-AC/R-MMU, and E-RAND/R-MMU is 96, 73, and 76 percentage
points, respectively. In the regret averse case, the greatest improvement of E-ON-MMR/R-MMR over E-AC/R-AC,
E-AC/R-MMR, and E-RAND/R-MMR is 80, 74, and 73 percentage points, respectively. Moreover, in this online
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Figure 5 Scalability results for the offline risk averse active preference elicitation problem (PKoff,risk) on synthetic
data. The facet labels, graphs, shapes, lines, and colors have the same interpretation as in Figure 4. In
particular, approach E-OFF-MMU is shown with red dots and the median (and range of) performance of
E-RAND across 50 random queries is shown with blue crosses (shade).
setting, with just a moderate number of queries, a normalized worst-case utility of one was achieved in
all cases where Γ = 0. Similarly, a normalized worst-case regret of zero was reached in most cases without
inconsistencies. This indicates that, if chosen strategically, a moderate number of queries is needed to be com-
petitive with the full information case. From the figures, it is also apparent that approach E-AC/R-AC, after
having asked several queries, may still perform worse that making a recommendation using R-MMU or R-MMR
directly without asking any queries. At the same time, the time needed to compute a query in E-ON-MMU
and E-ON-MMR is 16.48 and 1.57 seconds on average, respectively. Thus, our online elicitation procedure is
adequate for use in online (interactive) settings.
Comparison Between Max-Min Utility & Min-Max Regret Solutions. In the first set of experiments, we
observed that the max-min utility problem is more scalable than its min-max regret counterpart. In our
third set of experiments, we investigate whether there are benefits in employing the min-max regret solution
relative the max-min utility solution. For this reason, we study the worst-case utility and worst-case regret
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Figure 6 Optimality results for the offline regret averse active preference elicitation problem (PKoff,regret) on syn-
thetic data. The facet labels, graphs, shapes, lines, and colors have similar interpretation as in Figure 4.
In particular, approach E-OFF-MMR is shown with red dots and the median (and range of) performance
of E-RAND across 50 random queries is shown with blue crosses (shade).
of solutions to Problems (PKoff,risk) and (PKoff,regret), respectively, on a synthetic dataset with I = 10 items
and J = 10 features (Γ = 0). The results are summarized in Table 1. From the table, it can be seen that
employing the min-max regret criterion generally results in solutions that have lower worst-case regret but
that do perform more poorly in terms of worst-case utility.
Evaluation of Column-and-Constraint Generation, Symmetry Breaking, & Greedy Heuristic. For our
fourth set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of our speed-up strategies. To this end, we solve
the offline risk averse active preference elicitation problem (PKoff,risk) based on three synthetic datasets using
four different approaches: the MBLP problem (6), the MBLP problem (6) augmented with symmetry break-
ing constraints (see Section 7.1), the column-and-constraint generation (CCG) approach from Algorithm 2
augmented with symmetry breaking constraints, and the CCG-based conservative heuristic approach, see
Section EC.5.2. The results are provided in Table 2. From the table, it can be seen that the symmetry
breaking constraints and the CCG algorithm augmented with symmetry breaking significantly speed-up
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Figure 7 Scalability results for the offline regret averse active preference elicitation problem (PKoff,regret) on syn-
thetic data. The facet labels, graphs, shapes, lines, and colors have similar interpretation as in Figure 5.
In particular, approach E-OFF-MMR is shown with red dots and the median (and range of) performance
of E-RAND across 50 random queries is shown with blue crosses (shade).
computation and enable the solution of problems that could not be solved with the MBLP alone. From the
table, it also becomes apparent that the CCG-based conservative heuristic returns near-optimal solutions in
a fraction of the time, thus scaling to far larger instances.
8.5. Numerical Results on Real Data
We evaluate the benefits of our approach on the real dataset described in Section 8.2. For this dataset,
the worst-case utility after asking no queries and after asking all queries are equal and therefore no useful
information to maximize utility can be gained (in the worst-case) by asking queries. Thus, we focus our
analysis on the min-max regret case.
Offline Preference Elicitation: Optimality and Scalability Results. We compare our offline min-max regret
elicitation approach E-OFF-MMR/R-MMR to random elicitation E-RAND/R-MMR. The results are summarized on
Figure 10. From the figure, it can be see that E-OFF-MMR/R-MMR outperforms E-RAND/R-MMR. Indeed, the
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Figure 8 Optimality results for the online risk averse active preference elicitation problem (PKon,risk) on syn-
thetic data. The facet labels have the same interpretation as in Figure 4. The median performance of
E-ON-MMU/R-MMU across 50 random utility vectors u? is shown with red dots. The median performance
of E-RAND/R-MMU is shown with blue crosses. The median performance of E-AC/R-AC (resp. E-AC/R-MMU
is shown with green crosses (resp. triangles).
standardized worst-case regret using our elicitation approach drops to by 20 percentage points after just one
query and by 70 percentage points after 10 queries. On the other hand, the standardized worst-case regret
remains equal to 1 after one random query and does not drop below 0.85 after even 10 random queries (it
never decreases after 2 random queries). We also note that the evaluation time for a random set of queries
and the time to compute a near optimal set of queries are comparable.
Online Preference Elicitation: Optimality Results. For our last set of experiments, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of our online regret averse preference elicitation approach E-ON-MMR/R-MMR on the real dataset from
Section 8.2. We compare it to existing techniques from the literature, see Section 8.3. The results are sum-
marized on Figure 11. From the figure, it can be seen that the worst-case normalized regret of our proposed
approach drops by almost 80 percentage points after just 4 queries, and by 90 percentage points after 10
queries. On the other hand, the best approach from the literature has a worst-case normalized regret higher
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Figure 9 Optimality results for the online regret averse active preference elicitation problem (PKon,regret) on syn-
thetic data. The facet labels have the same interpretation as in Figure 6. The median performance of
E-ON-MMR/R-MMR across 50 random utility vectors u? is shown with red dots. The median performance
of E-RAND/R-MMR is shown with blue crosses. The median performance of E-AC/R-AC (resp. E-AC/R-MMR
is shown with green crosses (resp. triangles).
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Figure 10 Optimality (left) and scalability (right) results for the offline regret averse active preference elicitation
problem (PKoff,regret) on the real dataset. Approach E-OFF-MMR is shown with red dots and the median
(and range of) performance of E-RAND across 13 random queries is shown with blue crosses (shade).
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Table 1 Comparison between max-min utility and min-max regret based queries on a synthetic dataset with
I = 10 items and J = 10 features (Γ = 0). The max-min utility queries ι?u and min-max regret queries ι
?
r are
computed by solving the MBLP reformulations of Problems (PKoff,risk) and (PKoff,regret), respectively, using the
column-and-constraint generation algorithm. The decrease in normalized worst-case utility refers to the drop in
normalized worst-case utility experienced by employing the min-max regret rather than max-min utility solution,
computed as (unwc(ι
?
u)−unwc(ι?r )). Similarly, the decrease in normalized worst-case regret refers to the drop in
normalized worst-case regret experienced by employing the min-max regret rather than max-min utility solution,
computed as (rnwc(ι
?
u)− rnwc(ι?r )). All approaches were given a one hour time limit.
Max-Min Utility Solution Min-Max Regret Solution Decrease in
Normalized
Worst-Case
Utility (p.p.)
Decrease in
Normalized
Worst-Case
Regret (p.p.)
K
Normalized
Worst-Case
Utility
Normalized
Worst-Case
Regret
Normalized
Worst-Case
Utility
Normalized
Worst-Case
Regret
2 0.780 0.642 0.689 0.594 9.1 4.8
4 0.783 0.620 0.691 0.532 9.2 8.8
6 0.833 0.566 0.712 0.522 12.1 4.4
8 0.879 0.550 0.816 0.499 6.3 5.1
10 0.912 0.510 0.844 0.495 6.8 1.5
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Figure 11 Worst-case regret (left) and worst-case rank (right) of the recommended item for the online regret
averse active preference elicitation problem (PKon,regret) on the real dataset. The median performance of
E-ON-MMR/R-MMR across 13 random utility vectors u? is shown with red dots. The median performance
of E-RAND/R-MMR is shown with blue crosses. The median performance of E-AC/R-AC (resp. E-AC/R-MMR
is shown with green crosses (resp. triangles).
than 0.78 after even 10 queries. In addition, our approach is able to recommend a top ranked item after only
seven queries whereas the best approach from the literature offered the 6th ranked item after 10 queries.
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Table 2 Evaluation results of symmetry breaking constraints, CCG algorithm, and CCG-based greedy heuristic
approach on three synthetic datasets with I ∈ {5,10,20} items and J = 10 features (Γ = 0); A dash indicates that
the optimal solution was not found within the allotted 3 hour time limit.
I K
MBLP MBLP + Symm. Break. CCG + Symm. Break. Heuristic
Normalized
Objective
Value
Solve
Time
(sec)
Normalized
Objective
Value
Solve
Time
(sec)
Normalized
Objective
Value
Solve
Time
(sec)
Normalized
Objective
Value
Solve
Time
(sec)
5 2 0.800 0.34 0.800 0.25 0.800 0.77 0.800 0.51
5 4 0.932 622.64 0.932 2.45 0.932 5.48 0.932 1.40
5 6 0.978 6094.79 0.978 76.21 0.978 10.80 0.932 2.25
5 8 – – 0.978 1147.51 0.978 40.91 0.972 3.53
5 10 – – 1.000 5082.32 1.000 0.86 1.000 4.24
10 2 0.780 2.66 0.780 2.61 0.780 5.54 0.780 2.13
10 4 – – 0.879 1141.58 0.879 6054.11 0.783 5.67
10 6 – – – – – – 0.812 12.53
10 8 – – – – – – 0.879 21.44
10 10 – – – – – – 0.879 31.79
20 2 0.646 334.33 0.646 202.75 0.646 338.17 0.646 5.21
20 4 – – – – – – 0.658 23.24
20 6 – – – – – – 0.765 51.16
20 8 – – – – – – 0.786 84.35
20 10 – – – – – – 0.812 162.32
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed novel formulations for the offline and online risk averse and regret averse active
preference elicitation problems with and without inconsistencies. These take the form of robust optimization
problems with decision-dependent information discovery. We studied the complexity of these problems and
provided exact reformulations and conservative approximations of the offline and online problems, respec-
tively. We provided efficient solutions procedures and performed extensive computational experiments that
showed the superiority of our approach on both synthetic data and real data from the homeless management
information system. In the future, we plan to deploy this algorithm on Amazon Mechanical Turk10 and
on policy-makers at the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority to be able to elicit their preferences and
recommend housing allocation policies that best meet their needs to help mitigate homelessness.
Notes
1See https://www.google.com/maps.
2See https://www.apple.com/ios/maps/.
3See https://www.lahsa.org/.
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4See https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/hmis/.
5https://controllerdata.lacity.org/
6See https://www.uber.com.
7See https://www.lyft.com.
8See https://www.orgcode.com/.
9TAY VI-SPDAT stands for Transition Age Youth Vulnerability Index-Service Prioritization Decision Assistance
Tool; it is the tool used to assess homeless youth when they enter the housing allocation system.
10https://www.mturk.com
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E-Companion
EC.1. Proofs of Statements in Sections 3 and 4
The following proposition is needed in the proof of Lemma 1. It shows that we can eliminate the dependence
of S(ι) on ι in Problem (PKoff,risk).
Proposition EC.1. Problem (PKoff,risk) is equivalent to
maximize
ι∈CK
min
s∈SK
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x (EC.1)
in the sense that the two problems have the same optimal objective value and the same sets of optimal
solutions.
Proof Fix ι∈ CK . Fix s∈ SK\{S(ι)}. Then, U(ι,s) = ∅. Since the choice of s∈ SK\{S(ι)} was arbitrary,
it follows from R 6= ∅ that
min
s∈SK\{S(ι)}
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x = +∞.
Therefore,
min
s∈SK\{S(ι)}
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x ≥ min
s∈S(ι)
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x.
This implies that
min
s∈{S(ι)}∪SK\{S(ι)}
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x = min
s∈S(ι)
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x.
Since the choice of ι∈ CK was arbitrary, this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 1 From Proposition EC.1, it suffices to show that Problems (EC.1) and (2) are equiv-
alent. To this end, fix any ι∈ CK . We show that
min
s∈SK
max
x∈R
min
u∈U(ι,s)
u>x (EC.2)
and
min
s∈SK
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x (EC.3)
attain the same optimal value.
Since U(ι,s)⊆ U˜(ι,s), the optimal objective value of Problem (EC.3) constitutes a lower bound on the
optimal objective value of Problem (EC.2).
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For the converse part, observe that, by virtue of the linearity of u>x and the boundedness of U(ι,s),
Problems (EC.2) and (EC.3) have the same objective value for all s ∈ SK such that U(ι,s) 6= ∅ since, in
such cases, U˜(ι,s) = cl(U(ι,s)). Let s? be optimal in Problem (EC.3). If U(ι,s?) 6= ∅, the proof is complete.
Suppose instead that U(ι,s?) = ∅. Since U(ι,s?) = ∅ while U˜(ι,s?) 6= ∅, this implies that there exist implied
equalities in the set U˜(ι,s?). In particular, since U0 is full-dimensional, see Assumption 2, the implied
equalities are all associated with response constraints. Let us collect the indices κ of all those implied
equalities in the set E , i.e., let
E :=
{
κ∈K : sκ ∈ {−1,1}, u>(xικ1 −xικ2 ) = 0 ∀u∈ U˜(ι,s?)
}
.
Define
s′κ :=

1 if sκ = 1 and κ /∈ E ,
0 if sκ = 0 or κ∈ E ,
−1 if sκ =−1 and κ /∈ E .
This definition of s′ ensures that equality constraints that are implicit in the set U˜(ι,s?) are made explicit
in the set U˜(ι,s′). By construction, U˜(ι,s′) = U˜(ι,s?) and thus s′ is optimal in Problem (EC.3). Moreover,
since U˜(ι,s′) is non-empty, it follows by Proposition 2.3 in Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988) that U(ι,s′) is
non-empty. Thus, U˜(ι,s′) = cl(U(ι,s′)), implying that the objective value attained by s′ in Problem (EC.2)
equals the optimal objective value of Problem (EC.3). This in turn yields the required result that the
optimal objective value of Problem (EC.3) constitutes an upper bound on the optimal objective value of
Problem (EC.2).
Thus, the optimal values of Problems (EC.2) and (EC.3) are equal, which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Observation 1 Fix any ι∈ CK . Let s? be optimal in
min
s∈SK
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x (EC.4)
and define s′ ∈ S˜K ⊂SK through
s′κ :=

s?κ if s
?
κ 6= 0
1 else.
Then, U˜(ι,s′)⊇ U˜(ι,s?), implying that the objective value attained by s′ in Problem (EC.4) is no greater
than the objective value attained by s?. Thus, s′ is also optimal in (EC.4). Since s′ ∈ S˜K , this implies that
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we can always restrict our search for an optimal solution to Problem (EC.4) to the set S˜K . As the choice of
ι∈ CK was arbitrary, this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 1 (a) Fix any K ∈ N, ι ∈ CK , and s ∈ S˜K such that U˜(ι,s) 6= ∅. Then, U˜(ι,s) is
convex. If R is convex, it readily follows from the minimax theorem (see Von Neumann (1928)) that
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
max
x∈R
u>x = max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x.
Since the choices of K ∈N, ι∈ CK , and s∈ S˜K such that U˜(ι,s) 6= ∅ were arbitrary, it holds that (under the
premise of the theorem statement) Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is equivalent to
maximize
ι∈CK
min
s∈S˜K
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
max
x∈R
u>x. (EC.5)
Fix K ∈N. Then,
max
ι∈CK
min
s∈S˜K
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
max
x∈R
u>x
= max
ι∈CK
min
u∈ ⋃
s∈SK
U˜(ι,s)
max
x∈R
u>x
= max
ι∈CK
min
u∈U0
max
x∈R
u>x
= min
u∈U0
max
x∈R
u>x
= max
x∈R
min
u∈U0
u>x,
(EC.6)
where the first equality follows since, for any ι∈ CK , we have
{
u∈ U˜(ι,s) : s∈ S˜K
}
=
⋃
s∈S˜K
U˜(ι,s),
and the second equality follows by definitions of S˜K and U˜(ι,s). If the recommendation setR is a polyhedron,
then
max
x∈R
min
u∈U0
u>x
can be reformulated equivalently as a linear program of size polynomial in the size of the input parameters,
see e.g., Ben-Tal et al. (2009), and is thus polynomially solvable. Since the choice of K ∈ N above was
arbitrary, this concludes the first proof of the first item.
(b) We use a reduction from the following decision problem that is known to be NP-complete, see Garey
and Johnson (1979).
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Partition.
Instance. Given a set A of elements A := {1, . . . , n} with associated positive integer weights
wi ∈N+, i∈A, such that
∑
i∈A
wi = 2W .
Question. Does there exist a partition of A into two subsets, X and A\X , such that
∑
i∈X
wi =∑
i∈A\X
wi =W?
We aim to reduce the partition problem to evaluating the objective function of an instance of Prob-
lem (P˜Koff,risk). To this end, fix an instance (n,w,W ) of the partition problem. Set J := n+ 1, K = n, and
U0 := {u ∈ [0,1]J : uJ = 0.5}. Also, for each κ ∈ K, let ικ1 := eκ and ικ2 := eJ . Then, given a choice s ∈ S˜K ,
we have
U˜(ι,s) :=

u∈ [0,1]J : uJ = 0.5
uκ ≥ 0.5 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
uκ ≤ 0.5 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1

.
Finally, we define the recommendation set R⊆ RJ through R := {x1,x2}, where x1 := (2w>,−2W )> and
x2 := ((−2w)>,6W )>. For any fixed s∈ S˜K , define
Z(s) := max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x.
Then, we have
Z(s) = max
{(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
2uiwi− 2WuJ
)
,
(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
−2uiwi + 6WuJ
)}
= max
{(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
2uiwi
)
−W,
(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
−2uiwi + 2W
)
+W
}
= max
{(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
2uiwi
)
−W,
(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
−2uiwi +
∑
i∈A
wi
)
+W
}
= max
{(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
2uiwi
)
−W,
(
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
∑
i∈A
−2(ui− 0.5)wi
)
+W
}
= max
{ ∑
κ∈K:sκ=1
wκ−W,
∑
κ∈K:sκ=1
−wκ +W
}
≥ 0.
Now, we claim that we are given a “yes” instance of Partition if and only the objective value of ι in the
constructed instance of Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is 0. To this end, note that the objective value of ι is given by
minimize
s∈S˜K
Z(s) (EC.7)
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and is lower bounded by 0. If there exists X ⊂A such that ∑
i∈X wi =W , then the solution s∈ S˜K defined
through sκ = 1 if κ∈X , =−1 else, κ∈K, attains an objective value of zero in Problem (EC.7). Conversely,
if the optimal objective value of Problem (EC.7) is zero, then the set X := {κ ∈ A : sκ = 1} is such that∑
i∈X wi =W and the claim follows. This concludes the proof of the second item.
Both items are thus proved. 
Proof of Proposition 1 Fix ι ∈ CK , s ∈ S˜K , and x ∈ R and consider the inner minimization problem
in (Rrisk). Since no element of s is zero, this inner problem is expressible as
minimize u>x
subject to u∈RJ
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )≥ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )≤ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1
Bu≥ b,
or equivalently as
minimize u>x
subject to u∈RJ
u>[sκ (xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )]≥ 0 ∀κ∈K
Bu≥ b.
Its dual reads
maximize b>β
subject to α∈RK+ , β ∈RM+∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β=x.
(EC.8)
Next, we claim that the primal-dual pair above satisfies strong duality. If s ∈ S(ι), then U(ι,s) and thus
also U˜(ι,s) are non-empty. Since U˜(ι,s) is non-empty and compact, by Assumption 2, it follows that the
primal problem above is feasible and bounded, so that it is solvable. We show that the statement also holds
if s /∈ S(ι). If s /∈ S(ι), then the primal problem is infeasible. This implies that the dual is either infeasible
or unbounded. We show that it cannot be infeasible. Fix α= 0 in the dual. Then, the dual reduces to
maximize b>β
subject to β ∈RM+
B>β=x.
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By Farkas’ lemma, exactly one of the following alternatives must hold: a) There exists β ∈ RM+ such that
B>β = x; or b) There exists u ∈ RJ such that Bu ≥ 0 and u>x < 0. Since the set U0 is bounded, by
Assumption 2, its recession cone coincides with the origin implying that assertion b) cannot hold so that the
dual must be feasible. We conclude that the dual must be unbounded so that the optimal objective values
of the primal and dual problems coincide for all s∈ S˜K .
Combining the dual problem (EC.8) with the outer maximization in (Rrisk) yields Problem (3) which, for
fixed ι∈ C, s∈ S˜, and x∈R is a linear program if R is polyhedral and a mixed-binary linear program if R
also involves integrality constraints. 
Proof of Observation 2 Fix ι∈ CK . Then,
min
s∈S˜K
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x
= min
{
max
xs∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>xs
}
s∈S˜K
= max
xs∈R:
s∈S˜K
min
{
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>xs
}
s∈S˜K
= max
xs∈R:
s∈S˜K
min
s∈S˜K
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>xs,
(EC.9)
where the second equality follows from the fact that each term in the minimum involves a different set of
variables in the maximum, which can be optimized separately. Since the choice of ι∈ CK was arbitrary, the
claim follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2 Problem (4) can be written in epigraph form equivalently as
maximize τ
subject to ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
τ ≤ min
s∈S˜K
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>xs.
The problem above is in turn equivalent to
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
τ ≤ min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>xs ∀s∈ S˜K .
(EC.10)
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To reformulate this robust problem which involves infinitely many constraints as a finite program, we employ
techniques from robust optimization. Fix s ∈ S˜K , ι ∈ CK , and xs ∈R, and consider the minimization sub-
problem associated with s in the epigraph constraint. This subproblem reads
minimize u>xs
subject to u∈RJ
u>[sκ(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )]≥ 0 ∀κ∈K
Bu≥ b.
Its dual is expressible as
maximize b>βs
subject to αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αsκ +B>βs = xs
Following a proof strategy similar to that taken in the proof of Proposition 1 (based on Farkas’ lemma), we
conclude that the optimal objective values of the primal-dual pair above are always equal (even when the
primal is infeasible). Replacing each minimization subproblem in Problem (EC.10) with its dual, we obtain
the equivalent reformulation
max τ
s. t. τ ∈R, ι∈ CK
αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , xs ∈R
τ ≤ b>βs∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αsκ +B>βs = xs

∀s∈ S˜K ,
which concludes the proof. 
ec8 e-companion to Vayanos, McElfresh, Ye, Dickerson, Rice: Active Preference Elicitation via Robust Optimization
Proof of Theorem 2 We begin by showing that Problem (5) is equivalent to
maximize τ
subject to τ ∈R, vκ, wκ ∈ {0,1}I , κ∈K
αs ∈RK+ , βs ∈RM+ , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
τ ≤ b>βs∑
κ∈K
sκ
∑
i∈I
xi (vκi −wκi )αsκ +B>βs = xs
 ∀s∈ S˜K
e>vκ = 1, e>wκ = 1
1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I
 ∀κ∈K.
(EC.11)
For the first direction, let (τ, ι,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S˜K ) be feasible in Problem (5). For each κ∈K, define vκ and
wκ ∈ {0,1}I through
vκi :=

1 if ικ1 = i
0 else,
and wκi :=

1 if ικ2 = i
0 else,
for each i ∈ I. Fix κ ∈ K. Since ικ ∈ C, it readily follows that ικ1 and ικ2 are both in I, implying that
e>vκ = e>wκ = 1. Fix i∈ I. If wκi = 0, then it holds that 1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i v
κ
i′ . On the other hand, if w
κ
i = 1,
then it holds that ικ2 = i. But since ι
κ ∈ C, it holds that ικ1 < ικ2 = i, i.e., there must exist i′ < i such that
ικ1 = i
′ and vi′ = 1. This in turn implies that
∑
i′:i′≥i v
κ
i′ = 0, and therefore 1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i v
κ
i′ holds. Since
the choice of κ∈K and i∈ I was arbitrary, it holds that
e>vκ = 1, e>wκ = 1
1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I
 ∀κ∈K.
Fix s∈ S˜K and κ∈K. Then, ∑
i∈I
xi (vκi −wκi )αsκ = (xι
κ
1 −xικ1 )αsκ
holds trivially by definition of vκ and wκ. Thus, (τ,{vκ,wκ}κ∈K,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S˜K ) is feasible in Prob-
lem (EC.11) with objective value equal to τ .
For the other direction, let (τ,{vκ,wκ}κ∈K,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S˜K ) be feasible in Problem (EC.11). Define
ικ1 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (vκi = 1) and ικ2 =
∑
i∈I
i · I (wκi = 1) .
Fix κ∈K. Then, ικ1 and ικ2 are both in the set I. It follows from
1−wκi ≥
∑
i′:i′≥i
vκi′ ∀i∈ I
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that if wκi = 1, then ι
κ
2 = i and
∑
i′:i′≥i v
κ
i′ = 0, implying that
∑
i′:i′<i v
κ
i′ = 1, i.e., ι
κ
1 < i = ι
κ
2 and it holds
that ικ ∈ C. Since the choice of κ was arbitrary, ι∈ CK . Fix s∈ S˜K and κ∈K. Then,
(xι
κ
1 −xικ1 )αsκ =
∑
i∈I
xi (vκi −wκi )αsκ
holds trivially by definition of ικ. Therefore, (τ, ι,{αs,βs,xs}s∈S˜K ) is feasible in Problem (5) with objective
value equal to τ . We have thus shown that Problems (5) and (EC.11) are equivalent.
Equivalence of the bilinear problem (EC.11) and the MILP (6) follows directly by using standard lineariza-
tion techniques which apply since all bilinear terms involve products of binary and real valued variables, see
e.g., Hillier (2012). 
Proof of Proposition 2 Since ι is feasible in Problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)), it follows that ι∈ CK . By following
a proof strategy similar to that in the Proof of Proposition 1 (based on Farkas’ lemma), it follows that ι is
feasible in Problem (P˜Koff,risk). Thus, it remains to show that for any given ι ∈ CK , Problem (CCGfeasrisk(ι)) is
equivalent to
minimize
s∈S˜K
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x (EC.12)
in the sense that the two problems have the same optimal objective value. To this end, fix ι∈ CK . Using an
epigraph reformulation, we can write Problem (EC.12) equivalently as
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K
θ ≥ max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x.
(EC.13)
Since R has fixed finite cardinality, we can equivalently express the above problem as
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K
ux ∈ U˜(ι,s) ∀x∈R
θ ≥ (ux)>x ∀x∈R.
From the definition of U˜(ι,s), we can rewrite the preceding problem equivalently as
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, ux ∈ U0 ∀x∈R, s∈ SK
θ ≥ (ux)>x ∀x∈R
(ux)>(xιk −xι′k) ≥ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
(ux)>(xιk −xι′k) ≤ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1
 ∀x∈R,
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which, for M sufficiently large, is equivalent to Problem (CCGfeasrisk(ι)). Thus, Problems (EC.12)
and (CCGfeasrisk(ι)) are equivalent. Since the choice of ι was arbitrary, the claim follows. 
Proof of Lemma 3 (i) By virtue of Proposition 2, θ yields a lower bound to the optimal value of
Problem (P˜Koff,risk). At the same time, since S ′ ⊆ S˜K , it is evident that τ is an upper bound to the
optimal objective value of Problem (P˜Koff,risk). Therefore, θ≤ τ .
(ii) Suppose that θ = τ and that there exists s ∈ S˜K such that Problem (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι)) is infeasible. This
implies that Problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is solvable and that there exists s ∈ S˜K such that τ is strictly
larger than the optimal objective value of
maximize b>β
subject to x∈R, α∈RK , β ∈RM+∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β=x.
(EC.14)
An inspection of the proof of Proposition 2 reveals that Problems (CCGfeasrisk(ι)) and (EC.12) are equiv-
alent. An inspection of the proof of Lemma 2 shows that Problem (EC.12) is equivalent to
minimize
s∈S˜K
max b>β
s. t. x∈R, α∈RK , β ∈RM+∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β=x.
(EC.15)
Thus, Problems (EC.15) and (CCGfeasrisk(ι)) are equivalent and Problem (EC.15) has an optimal objective
value of θ. This implies that θ < τ , a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose θ < τ , and let s be defined as in the premise of the lemma. Then, the proof of item (ii) reveals
that s must be optimal in Problem (EC.15) with associated optimal value θ. This in turn implies that
s is such that the optimal objective value of Problem (EC.14) is strictly less than τ , implying that the
sth subproblem (CCGsub,srisk (τ, ι)) is infeasible, which concludes the proof.
We have thus proved all claims. 
Proof of Theorem 3 First, note that finite termination is guaranteed since at each iteration, either UB−
LB ≤ δ (in which case the algorithm terminates) or a new set of constraints (indexed by the infeasible
index s) is added to the master problem CCGmasterrisk (S ′), see Lemma 3. Since the set of all indices S˜K is finite,
the algorithm will terminate in a finite number of steps. Second, by construction, at any iteration of the
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algorithm, τ (i.e., UB) provides a upper bound on the optimal objective value of the problem. On the other
hand, the returned (feasible) solution has as objective value θ (i.e., LB). Since the algorithm only terminates
if UB− LB≤ δ, we are guaranteed that, at termination, the returned solution will have an objective value
that is within δ of the optimal objective value of the problem. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4 The proof of this statement parallels exactly the proof of Theorem 1 part (b) and
can thus be omitted. 
EC.2. Proofs of Statements in Sections 5
Proof of Lemma 4 The proof parallels exactly the proof of Lemma 1 and Observation 1 and can thus
be omitted. 
Proof of Theorem 5 We use a reduction from Partition, as in the proof of Theorem 1. We aim to
reduce the partition problem to evaluating the objective function of an instance of Problem (P˜Koff,regret). For
convenience, we work with the negative of the objective function of Problem (P˜Koff,regret) given by
minimize
s∈S˜K
max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
{
min
x′∈R
u>x−u>x′
}
.
To this end, fix an instance (n,w,W ) of the partition problem. Set J := 2n+ 3, K := n, and
U0 :=

u∈R2n+3 : ui ∈ [0,1] ∀i∈ {1, . . . , n}
un+i = ui− 0.5 ∀i∈ {1, . . . , n}
u2n+1 ∈ [0,1]
u2n+2 ∈ [−1,1]
u2n+3 = 0.5

.
Also, for each κ∈K, let ικ1 := eκ and ικ2 := e2n+3. Then, given a choice s∈ S˜K , we have
U˜(ι,s) :=

u∈ U0 : uκ ≥ 0.5 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
uκ ≤ 0.5 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1
 .
Finally, we define the recommendation set R⊆RJ through R := {x1,x2}, where x1 := (w>,0>,−W,0,0)>
and x2 := (0>,−w>,W,2W,0)>. For any fixed s∈ S˜K , define
Z(s) := max
x∈R
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
min
x′∈R
{
u>x−u>x′ } .
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Then, we have
Z(s) = max
x∈R
min
{
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x−x1), min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x−x2)
}
= max
[
min
{
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x1−x1), min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x1−x2)
}
,
min
{
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x2−x1), min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x2−x2)
}]
= max
[
min
{
0, min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x1−x2)
}
, min
{
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x2−x1), 0
}]
.
Next, observe that
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x1−x2)
= min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
n∑
i=1
uiwi +
n∑
i=1
un+iwi− 2u2n+1W − 2u2n+2W + 0 ·u2n+3
= min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
n∑
i=1
(2ui− 0.5)wi− 2W − 2W
= min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
n∑
i=1
2uiwi−W − 2W − 2W
=
∑
κ∈K:sκ=1
wκ−W − 4W
≤ 0.
Similarly, it holds that
min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x2−x1)
= min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
n∑
i=1
−uiwi +
n∑
i=1
−un+iwi + 2u2n+1W + 2u2n+2W − 0 ·u2n+3
= min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
n∑
i=1
−(2ui− 0.5)wi + 0− 2W
= min
u∈U˜(ι,s)
n∑
i=1
−2(ui− 0.5)wi−W + 0− 2W − 2W + 2W
=
∑
κ∈K:sκ=1
−wκ +W − 4W
≤ 0.
Therefore,
Z(s) = max
{ ∑
κ∈K:sκ=1
wκ−W,
∑
κ∈K:sκ=1
−wκ +W
}
− 4W
≥ −4W.
Now, we claim that we are given a “yes” instance of Partition if and only the objective value of ι in the
constructed instance of Problem (P˜Koff,risk) is −4W . To this end, note that the objective value of ι is given
by
minimize
s∈S˜K
Z(s) (EC.16)
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and is lower bounded by −4W . If there exists X ⊂ A such that ∑
i∈X wi = W , then the solution s ∈ S˜K
defined through sκ = 1 if κ ∈ X , =−1 else, κ ∈ K, attains an objective value of −4W in Problem (EC.16).
Conversely, if the optimal objective value of Problem (EC.16) is −4W , then the set X := {κ∈A : sκ = 1} is
such that
∑
i∈X wi =W and the claim follows. This concludes the proof of the second item. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Fix ι ∈ CK , s ∈ S˜K and consider the resulting regret averse recommendation
problem problem given by
minimize
x∈R
max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
.
This problem can be written equivalently in epigraph form as
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, x∈R
θ ≥ max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
,
which is in turn equivalent to
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, x∈R
θ ≥ max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>x′−u>x ∀x′ ∈R.
(EC.17)
For any fixed x′ ∈R, the subproblem in the constraints of the above problem can be written explicitly as
maximize u>(x′−x)
subject to u∈RJ
u>[sκ (xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )]≥ 0 ∀κ∈K
Bu≥ b.
Its dual reads
minimize b>β
subject to α∈RK− , β ∈RM−∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β=x′−x.
By following a reasoning similar to that taken in the Proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that the primal-
dual pair above satisfies strong duality. Combining the dual problem above with the outer minimization
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in (EC.17) yields the equivalent formulation
minimize θ
subject to θ ∈R, x∈R
αx
′ ∈RK− , βx′ ∈RM−
θ ≥ b>βx′∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )αx′κ +B>βx
′
=x′−x

∀x′ ∈R,
which, for fixed ι∈ C and s∈ S˜ is a mixed-binary linear program if R has fixed finite cardinality. 
Proof of Lemma 5 In a way that parallels the proof of Observation 2, it can be readily shown that
Problem (7) is equivalent to
minimize
ι∈CK
min
xs∈R:
s∈S˜K
max
s∈S˜K
max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>xs
}
.
The above problem can be written in epigraph form equivalently as
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
τ ≥ max
s∈S˜K
max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
max
x′∈R
u>(x′−xs),
which is in turn equivalent to
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
τ ≥ max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
u>(x′−xs) ∀s∈ S˜K , ∀x′ ∈R.
(EC.18)
Fix s∈ S˜K , τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, and x′ ∈R and consider the associated maximization subproblem in the
constraints of the above problem. This reads
maximize u>(x′−xs)
subject to u∈RJ
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )≥ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
u>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 )≤ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1
Bu≥ b.
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Its dual is expressible as
minimize b>β(x
′,s)
subject to α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM−∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )α(x′,s)κ +B>βs =x′−xs.
Following a proof strategy similar to that taken in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that the
optimal objective values of the primal-dual pair above are always equal (even when the primal is infeasible).
Replacing each maximization subproblem in Problem (EC.18) with its dual yields the equivalent formulation
minimize τ
subject to τ ∈R, ι∈ CK , xs ∈R, s∈ S˜K
α(x
′,s) ∈RK− , β(x′,s) ∈RM−
τ ≥ b>β(x′,s)∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )α(x′,s)κ +B>β(x
′,s) =x′−xs

∀s∈ S˜K , ∀x′ ∈R.
(EC.19)
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 6 The proof follows directly by following an approach similar to that taken in the
Proof of Theorem 2 and is thus omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 4 Since ι is feasible in Problem (CCGmasterregret (S ′)), it follows that ι∈ CK . Thus, ι is
feasible in Problem (P˜Koff,regret). It remains to show that for any given ι∈ CK , Problems (CCGfeasregret(ι)) and
max
s∈S˜K
min
x∈R
max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
{
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x
}
(EC.20)
have the same optimal objective value. To this end, fix ι ∈ CK . Using an epigraph reformulation, we can
write Problem (EC.20) equivalently as
maximize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K
θ ≤ min
x∈R
max
u∈U˜(ι,s)
max
x′∈R
u>x′−u>x,
(EC.21)
and thus as
maximize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K ,
x′,x ∈R, ux ∈ U˜(ι,s) ∀x∈R
θ ≤ (ux)>(x′,x−x) ∀x∈R.
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By definition of U˜(ι,s), the above problem can be written as
maximize θ
subject to θ ∈R, s∈ S˜K
x′,x ∈R, ux ∈RJ ∀x∈R
θ ≤ (ux)>(x′,x−x) ∀x∈R
(ux)>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≥ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ = 1
(ux)>(xι
κ
1 −xικ2 ) ≤ 0 ∀κ∈K : sκ =−1
 ∀x∈R.
The claim then follows by rewriting the logical constraints above as linear constraints using a “big-M”
constant. 
Proof of Lemma 6 (i) By virtue of Proposition 4, θ yields an upper bound to the optimal value of the
Problem (P˜Koff,regret). At the same time, since R˜ ⊆R and S ′ ⊆ S˜K , it is evident that τ is a lower bound
on the optimal objective value of Problem (P˜Koff,regret). Therefore, θ≥ τ .
(ii) Suppose that θ = τ and that there exists x′ ∈R and s ∈ S˜K such that Problem (CCGsub,(x′,s)regret (τ, ι)) is
infeasible. This implies that Problem (CCGmasterrisk (S ′)) is solvable and that τ is strictly smaller than the
optimal objective value of
minimize b>β
subject to α∈RK− , β ∈RM− , x∈R∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β = x′−x.
(EC.22)
An inspection of the proof of Proposition 4 reveals that Problems (CCGfeasregret(ι)) and (EC.20) are
equivalent. An inspection of the proof of Lemma 5 shows that Problem (EC.20) is equivalent to
maximize
x′∈R, s∈S˜K
min b>β
s. t. α∈RK− , β ∈RM− , x∈R∑
κ∈K
sκ (x
ικ1 −xικ2 )ακ +B>β=x′−x.
(EC.23)
Thus, Problems (CCGfeasregret(ι)) and (EC.23) are equivalent and Problem (EC.23) has an optimal value
of θ. This implies that τ < θ, a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose θ > τ and let (x′,s) be defined as in the premise of the lemma. Then, the proof of item
(ii) reveals that s is optimal in (EC.20) with associated optimal value θ. This implies that s is such
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that the optimal objective value of Problem (EC.22) is strictly greater than τ , so that the (x′,s)th
subproblem (CCGsub,(x′,s)regret (τ, ι)) is infeasible, which concludes the proof.
All claims are thus proved. 
Proof of Theorem 7 The proof mirrors the proof of Theorem 3 and is thus omitted in the interest of
space. 
EC.3. Proofs of Statements in Section 6
Proof of Proposition 5 The proof parallels exactly the proof of Proposition 1 and is thus omitted.
Proof of Lemma 7 The proof parallels exactly the proof of Lemma 2 and is thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 9 The proof parallels the proofs of Proposition 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 3 and can
be omitted.
Proof of Lemma 8 The proof parallels exactly the proof of Lemma 5 and is thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 6 The proof parallels exactly the proof of Proposition 3 and is thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 11 The proof parallels the proofs of Proposition 4, Lemma 6, and Theorem 7 and
can be omitted.
EC.4. Companion to Section 7
Algorithm 5 details the procedure for generating warm-starts proposed in Section 7.2 to ensure that the
lexicographic constraints from Section 7.1 are satisfied.
EC.5. Companion to Section 8
EC.5.1. Additional Numerical Results for Online Elicitation in Section 8
In this section we provide additional results associated with the online preference elicitation numericals on
synthetic data that we presented in Section 8.4. These additional results are provided in Figure EC.1. In
particular, the two figures show the worst-case true rank and worst-case true utility of the recommended item
for the risk averse and regret averse cases, respectively. From the figures, it can be seen that our approaches
consistently outperform the state of the art in terms of both worst-case rank and worst-case utility of the
recommended item (although these are not quantities that we explicitly optimize for).
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Algorithm 5: An algorithm for building warm-starts
Inputs: A feasible solution (τ,v,w,α,β,x,v,w) to Problem (6) with K queries with objective τ ;
Output: A warm start (v˜, w˜, x˜) to Problem (6) with K + 1 queries with objective ≥ τ ;
Initialization:
for κ∈K do
ικ1←
∑
i∈I i · I (vκi = 1);
ικ2←
∑
i∈I i · I (wκi = 1);
end
C˜ ← { ι∈ C : ι 6= ικ, κ∈K };
Select ιK+1 at random from C˜;
for s∈ SK+1 do
x˜s := x(s1,...,sK);
end
(ι˜,`)← lexicographic order(ι);
for s∈ SK+1 do
x˜s← x˜s(`);
end
for κ∈K, i∈ I do
v˜κi ← I (ικ1 = i);
w˜κi ← I (ικ2 = i);
end
Result: (v˜, w˜, x˜)
Note: The lexicographic order function takes as input a collection of vectors and returns two elements;
the first element corresponds to the lexicographically ordered collection of vectors and the second
element is a vector of the same dimension as the number of vectors input whose ith element denotes
the position of the ith output vector in the input;
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EC.5.2. Greedy Solution Approach to Speed-Up Computations in Section 8
To speed-up solution of our problems so as to be able to showcase performance on a variety of instances,
we employ a heuristic approach in our experiments in Section 8, as detailed in Algorithm 6. A variant of
this approach has been previously used by Vayanos et al. (2019), see also Subramanyam et al. (2017). This
algorithm returns a feasible but potentially suboptimal solution to the MBLP counterpart of the offline
preference elicitation problem to be solved.
Algorithm 6: Heuristic algorithm for solving Problem (PKoff,risk), (PKoff,regret), (PΓ,Koff,risk), or (PΓ,Koff,regret);
adapted from Vayanos et al. (2019), Subramanyam et al. (2017).
Inputs: Instance of Problem (PKoff,risk), (PKoff,regret), (PΓ,Koff,risk), or (PΓ,Koff,regret);
Output: Conservative (suboptimal) set of K queries {ικ}κ∈K to ask the user;
for κ∈ {1, . . . ,K} do
if κ= 1 then
Solve the MBLP reformulation of Problem (P1off,risk), (P1off,regret), (PΓ,1off,risk), or (PΓ,1off,regret);
Let ι?,1 denote an optimal query;
else
Solve the MBLP reformulation of Problem (Pκoff,risk), (Pκoff,regret), (PΓ,κoff,risk), or (PΓ,κoff,regret) with
the added constraints that ιk = ι?,k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , κ− 1};
Let {ι?,k}κk=1 denote an optimal query;
end
end
Result: Return {ι?,κ}κ∈K.
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Figure EC.1 The figure at the top (resp. bottom) shows the empirical worst-case rank of the recommended item
(worst-case taken across sampled agents) for the online risk (resp. regret) averse active preference
elicitation problem (PKon,risk) ((PKon,regret)) on synthetic data. The facet labels have the same interpre-
tation as in Figure 4 (6). The performance of E-ON-MMU/R-MMU (E-ON-MMR/R-MMR) across 50 random
utility vectors u? is shown with red dots. The performance of E-RAND/R-MMU (E-RAND/R-MMR) is
shown with blue crosses. The performance of E-AC/R-AC is shown with green crosses. The perfor-
mance of E-AC/R-MMU (E-AC/R-MMR) is shown with green triangles.
